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Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts, or to abolish 
distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so 
can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation.1 
[G]roup relations have been the last fortress of the doctrine of 
laissez faire. Long after resort to legislation to curb existing evils had 
been taken for granted, the theory survived that discrimination was not 
susceptible to this treatment. The past decade has given the death blow 
to that theory.2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Brown v. Board of Education3 emerged from a constellation of assumptions 
about race and law, the contours of which have yet to be fully reconstructed. We 
are familiar with the efforts of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP) and their allies to attack the belief, infamously espoused 
in Plessy v. Ferguson,4 that segregation imposed no necessary badge of inferiority 
on African Americans.5 Familiar, too, is the growing recognition by the middle of 
the twentieth century of the importance of education to modern American society, 
a factor Chief Justice Earl Warren highlighted in the Brown opinion.6 And recently 
scholars have drawn attention to the critical role of Cold War foreign policy in 
creating pressure for civil rights reform.7 But there was another issue that 
permeated the intellectual landscape during the early post–World War II period in 
which Brown was born that has largely been overlooked in the scholarship: 
whether law even had the power to affect the racial prejudice that motivated the 
practices and customs of white supremacy in the Jim Crow era. Without a 
commitment to the belief that the guiding hand of the law had the capacity to 
weaken racial animosity, much of the nascent civil rights project threatened to 
dissolve. A critical factor in the emergence of civil rights as a viable national issue 
was the work of activists, lawyers, and scholars who pressed upon the nation their 
faith in the efficacy of civil rights reform. 
As the United States emerged from World War II, the battle over the 
fundamental wrongness of racial segregation, while far from over, was well on its 
way toward resolution. The real question for the nation was not whether the nation 
1 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
2 Will Maslow & Joseph B. Robison, Civil Rights Legislation and the Fight for 
Equality, 1862–1952, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 413 (1953). 
3 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
4 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
5 Id. at 551. 
6 347 U.S. at 492–93. 
7 See, e.g., MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 79–115 (2000). 
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would be better off, from the perspective of morality, economics, and world 
opinion, without Jim Crow, but the best way to achieve this desired end. Since the 
late nineteenth century, most Americans agreed that racial progress would be 
achieved by education rather than legislation. Improving race relations required 
attacking prejudicial attitudes rather than discriminatory actions—the logic being 
that the latter was only the product of the former. In the years leading up to Brown, 
a pervasive, commonplace argument against civil rights legislation and judicial 
rulings was that beliefs, not laws, dictated behavior. This was the assumption of 
the Plessy Court—that laws were “powerless to eradicate racial instincts” and 
“social prejudices.”8 This was the claim captured in the popular dictum put forth 
by Yale University sociologist William Graham Sumner, which encapsulated the 
prevalent social-Darwinist assumption of the Jim Crow era, that “stateways” were 
powerless to change “folkways.”9 The lessons of history seemed only to confirm 
these assumptions. Post–Civil War efforts to promote equality for the freed slaves 
resulted in a “tragic era”10 of Reconstruction, demonstrating that civil rights laws, 
even when backed by military force, were ultimately ineffectual in cracking the 
white South’s deep commitment to racial supremacy. And the embarrassing 
experience of Prohibition, the “noble experiment” of banning alcohol that the 
nation abandoned in 1933, fourteen years after it began, only strengthened the 
claim that laws were powerless, even counterproductive, when placed in 
opposition to entrenched customs.  
In an effort to overcome these pessimistic assumptions toward the law, in the 
1940s and 1950s a generation of liberal social scientists, historians, and lawyers 
rallied around a new approach. Change the laws, racial liberals argued, and 
attitudes and customs will follow. The prejudices that pulled the races apart were 
not particularly deep-seated; indeed, they were themselves the product of laws that 
required the separation of the races. Remove legal barriers preventing blacks and 
whites from living and working together, and they will begin to understand each 
other; proximity encouraged by legal compulsion can lead to tolerance. Law, they 
emphasized, involved more than enforcement, more than the raw application of 
power; it also involved moral leadership and education. As the nation emerged 
from the war years, racial liberals optimistically saw the country as poised to 
squarely address its increasingly embarrassing and anachronistic racial practices, 
and, in such a climate, legal reform would prove to be the critical next step. In 
short, prohibit discrimination, and race relations will improve. Guided by carefully 
considered legal reform, postwar racial liberals envisioned a new era in race 
relations, driven by the nation’s basic commitment to the principle of equality, now 
released from the shackles of Jim Crow laws. “Freedom comes only from the law,” 
                                                
8 163 U.S. at 551. 
9 WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL 
IMPORTANCE OF USAGES, MANNERS, CUSTOMS, MORES, AND MORALS 77–78 (Ginn & 
Company 1940) (1906). 
10 See CLAUDE G. BOWERS, THE TRAGIC ERA: THE REVOLUTION AFTER LINCOLN 
(1929). 
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proclaimed legal scholar and civil rights activist Milton Konvitz,11 thus 
summarizing an essential tenet of postwar racial liberalism. 
This vision of the capacity of the law—a mixture of insight and inspiration, 
analysis and hopeful thinking—was remarkably compelling for many Americans at 
midcentury. In one form or another, the belief that civil rights law could eradicate 
prejudice, and do so in relatively short order, would be internalized by a growing 
number of reformers and policymakers. Yet, as the principle of civil rights gained 
strength, considerable skepticism remained about whether judicial leadership in the 
area of civil rights could be effective. When the judiciary served its paradigmatic 
role of protecting minority rights against majority interests—a role the Supreme 
Court embraced with increasing seriousness during these years—it necessarily 
tested the power of the law to uproot entrenched customs. For the Supreme Court 
to strike down Jim Crow laws would be the most direct test of the racial liberal 
claims about the efficacy of civil rights law. The newly emergent confidence in 
law played a prominent role in swaying several members of the Supreme Court, in 
1954, to refute the assumptions on which Plessy was based and hold racial 
segregation in schools unconstitutional.12  
This Article makes several contributions to legal scholarship. Most 
importantly, it brings to light a factor in the emergence of the civil rights 
revolution of the 1950s and 1960s that has largely been forgotten. The widespread 
acceptance of the legalist arguments was a necessary step in the creation of the 
modern concept of civil rights, which is based on the faith that legal institutions—
particularly the federal courts—should be at the center of the struggle for racial 
equality. The allure of this distinctly modern faith in civil rights law was an 
important factor in the decline of alternative approaches to dealing with racial 
inequality, including reform efforts that put more emphasis on economic and 
structural inequality.13 Furthermore, a deeper appreciation for the importance of 
the debate over the capacity of the law in the early postwar period highlights the 
interrelations between the efforts to create support for federal civil rights law and 
the previous achievements of the New Deal, as well as the significant civil rights 
efforts taking place on the state and local level during these years. Postwar racial 
liberals looked to all these sources in making their case for the law. 
My analysis also adds to our understanding of historical developments since 
Brown. For example, by appreciating the effort that went into the pre-Brown 
campaign to make a case for the power of law, we can better understand the 
remarkable optimism that accompanied the Supreme Court’s decision. After 
spending years trying to convince policymakers and judges that civil rights law 
was the key to moving beyond Jim Crow, and that the South was ready to accept 
                                                
11 MILTON R. KONVITZ, THE CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS viii (1947). 
12  See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
13 See, e.g., RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007); Robert 
Korstad & Nelson Lichtenstein, Opportunities Found and Lost: Labor, Radicals, and the 
Early Civil Rights Movement, 75 J. AM. HIST. 786 (1988); Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking 
Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256 (2005). 
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legal change, there was a sense among civil rights lawyers, activists, and many 
government officials (including a majority of Supreme Court Justices) that with 
Brown the major battle had been won. Even when the Court issued its 1955 
implementation decision (Brown II),14 with its instruction to desegregate “with all 
deliberate speed,”15 true believers in the racial liberal position were undeterred. “I 
think it’s a damned good decision!” Thurgood Marshall pronounced after Brown 
II.16 “[T]he laws have got to yield! They’ve got to yield to the Constitution.”17 But 
Marshall (along with many other racial liberals) was overly optimistic, as the rise 
of massive resistance in the wake of Brown II would attest. This was the double-
edged sword of the deep faith in the capacity of the law: it was an essential part of 
the civil rights reform efforts of the 1945–1955 period, but it also risked pulling 
attention away from the grassroots struggles that would be necessary to translate 
legal mandates into social reality. 
Finally, this Article provides a missing element in the history of the ongoing 
debate over the role of the courts in social change. The prevalent faith in the courts 
as the leading edge of reform—what Laura Kalman has termed “legal 
liberalism”18—has too often been attributed to Brown itself.19 But I argue that legal 
liberalism was not the product of Brown; rather, Brown was the product of legal 
liberalism. It took at least a decade of activism, scholarship, and litigation to 
construct and promulgate racial liberal ideology, and it was the persuasive power 
of this ideology that made Brown possible. In illuminating the lost history of the 
postwar debate over the capacity of the law to affect race relations, this Article 
provides a more complete lineage of legal liberalism. 
This Article is divided into four main sections. Part II examines the belief, 
prevalent in the late nineteenth century, that laws were of limited efficacy in 
challenging racial hierarchies, and the continued vitality of this concept in the first 
half of the twentieth century. Part III describes the efforts of social scientists and 
historians in the early postwar period to refute the legal skeptics and construct a 
new vision of the law as uniquely effective at reforming entrenched social patterns 
and racial prejudices. Part IV turns to Brown, describing the application of these 
new arguments for the capacity of the law by NAACP lawyers, the efforts to refute 
these arguments by their opponents, and the Supreme Court Justices’ receptivity to 
the legalist arguments. Part V examines the resurgence, in the wake of widespread 
resistance to Brown in the South, of a more circumspect vision of civil rights law. 
Disappointment at Brown’s failure to move the South to abandon segregation was 
                                                
14 Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
15 Id. at 301. 
16 RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 746 (1976) (quoting 
Marshall in transcribed conversation with Carl Murphy). 
17 Id. at 747. 
18 LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 2 (1996). 
19 Id.; see also Mack, supra note 13, at 265 (“The legal liberal interpretation of civil 
rights lawyering and politics emerged only after the apparent success of a particular mode 
of civil rights lawyering in the Brown litigation.”). 
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a critical contributing factor in the emergence of a movement of direct-action 
protest against Jim Crow, a movement driven by the belief that legal proclamations 
alone would not change society. 
 
II.  “FOLKWAYS” AND “STATEWAYS” IN THE JIM CROW ERA 
 
A.  The Folkways Principle Defined 
 
Civil rights advocates in the middle decades of the twentieth century who 
looked back at the late-nineteenth-century birth moment of Jim Crow America 
were invariably drawn to two statements that seemed to encapsulate that era’s 
pessimistic, fatalistic vision toward civil rights reform. One was a dictum put forth 
by Yale University professor William Graham Sumner, which captured the 
prevalent social-Darwinist assumptions of the day: “Stateways,” he declared, were 
powerless to change “folkways.”20 The other was the language found in the 
majority opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, in which the Court expressed skepticism 
toward civil rights laws that conflicted with society’s natural racial prejudices. 21 
The Plessy decision of 1896 offered one of the most famous articulations of 
the principle against which mid-twentieth-century racial liberals fought. 
“Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts, or to abolish distinctions 
based upon physical differences,” the Court explained in upholding a Louisiana 
railroad segregation statute, “and the attempt to do so can only result in 
accentuating the difficulties of the present situation.”22 The Court further stated 
that the belief “that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and that 
equal rights cannot be secured to the negro except by enforced commingling of the 
two races” was deeply misguided.23  
 
The object of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment was undoubtedly to 
enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but, in the 
nature of things, it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions 
based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political, 
equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to 
either . . . .  
. . . . 
. . . If one race be inferior to the other socially, the constitution of 
the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.24 
 
This skepticism toward improving race relations through the force of law 
reinforced the Court’s narrow vision of the Fourteenth Amendment that allowed 
                                                
20 See SUMNER, supra note 9. 
21 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
22 Id.  
23  Id.  
24 Id. at 544, 552. 
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states broad discretion in aligning racially discriminatory laws with local customs. 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the only relevant concern for the Court was 
whether the law was reasonable, and “[i]n determining the question of 
reasonableness, it is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, 
customs, and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their 
comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order.”25 Social change, 
if it were to arrive, would do so through pressures other than legal compulsion. “If 
the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of 
natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other’s merits, and a voluntary 
consent of individuals.”26 Plessy is pervaded with a general skepticism toward the 
power of the law to effect change in the “social” sphere.27 
In many ways, Plessy was unexceptional for its day, both in the legal standard 
established and in the ideological commitments on which the Court relied.28 In 
dismissing civil rights policy as ill-advised intervention into relationships that were 
best regulated by prevailing local norms and customs, the Court drew upon a 
widely held assumption of the period. The majority opinion quoted from a decision 
of the New York Court of Appeals, People ex rel. King v. Gallagher (1883), which 
concluded that social equality “can neither be accomplished nor promoted by laws 
which conflict with the general sentiment of the community upon whom they are 
designed to operate.”29 New York’s highest court argued (in a section not quoted in 
Plessy):  
 
In the nature of things there must be many social distinctions and 
privileges remaining unregulated by law and left within the control of the 
individual citizens, as being beyond the reach of the legislative functions 
of government to organize or control. The attempt to enforce social 
intimacy and intercourse between the races, by legal enactments, would 
probably tend only to embitter the prejudices, if any such there are, 
which exist between them, and produce an evil instead of a good result.30  
 
If interracial “intercourse” were to develop, it would only be because of “the 
operation of natural laws and the merits of individuals, and [could] exist and be 
                                                
25 Id. at 550. 
26 Id. at 551. 
27 See, e.g., id. at 551 (referring to segregation law as creating “merely a legal 
distinction” (emphasis added)). 
28 See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 8–60 (2004); CHARLES A. LOFGREN, 
THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 174–75 (1987). See generally 
GEORGE M. FREDERICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON 
AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817–1914, at 275–82 (1971) (describing 
surge in racist thought and violence at the turn of the twentieth century). 
29 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551 (quoting People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 448 
(1883)). 
30 People ex rel. King, 93 N.Y. at 448. 
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enjoyed only by the voluntary consent of the persons between whom such relations 
[might] arise.”31 Five years later, the same New York court reiterated its skeptical 
view of the law when placed in opposition to entrenched racial custom. In the 
process of upholding a state public accommodation law, it emphasized the point, 
which the Plessy Court would reiterate, that “[i]t is, of course, impossible to 
enforce social equality by law.”32 
Such assumptions were most rigorously theorized and starkly voiced by 
proponents of “social Darwinism.” Social Darwinists argued that cultures tend to 
conform to patterns of behavior that have a settled, even “natural” quality to them, 
being the end product of generations of testing and experimentation. To attack the 
cultural commitments on which social relations rely through ambitious legal 
reform, adherents to this conservative ideology concluded, was sheer folly. English 
philosopher Herbert Spencer, the originator of the term “survival of the fittest,” 
went so far as to argue that state regulation risked disrupting the beneficial 
pathways of natural selection.33 Social welfare programs “put a stop to that natural 
process of elimination by which society continually purifies itself.”34 
Even if one preferred not to embrace the brutal, amoral consequences of 
Spencer’s extreme defense of laissez faire policy, the basic premise of social 
Darwinist theorists, that social patterns and customs derived from a complex 
selection process that should not be disturbed precipitously, became a powerful 
bulwark of the status quo against all forms of social welfare legislation, 
particularly in the area of race relations.35 William Graham Sumner, the most 
influential advocate of social Darwinism in the United States, argued that 
“folkways”—the customs, mores, and traditions that made up a culture—were the 
product of evolutionary “natural forces,” and were therefore largely immune from 
legal constraints that attempted to drastically reshape them.36 The best laws could 
do was reinforce already established majority customs and beliefs. For generations 
of southern proponents of Jim Crow, Sumner’s dictum that “stateways” were 
                                                
31 Id. 
32 People v. King, 110 N.Y. 418, 427 (1888). 
33 CARL N. DEGLER, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE: THE DECLINE AND REVIVAL OF 
DARWINISM IN AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT 11 (1991).  
34 Id. 
35 Social Darwinism was a basis for theories of scientific racism. If existing social 
patterns were the product a natural selection process, then the fact of white supremacy 
reflects innate superiority of the white race. In this way, social Darwinists supported the 
naturalization of socially constructed racial hierarchies. Scientific racism was a key 
intellectual prop for the development and perpetuation of the Jim Crow regime in the South 
as well as its general acceptance among whites outside the South. See, e.g., id.; Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J.  624, 634–35 
(1985).  
36 SUMNER, supra note 9, at 55–57, 77–78, 87. 
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powerless to change “folkways” became, according to Gunnar Myrdal, “a general 
formula of mystical significance.”37 
A skepticism that the guiding hand of the law could improve race relations 
pervaded American society by the early twentieth century. The idealistic post–
Civil War moment in which the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments 
were ratified had faded into the past. Congress’s last effort in the field of civil 
rights, the ambitious public accommodations legislation in the Civil Rights Act of 
1875, had been struck down by the Supreme Court in 1883.38 After Reconstruction, 
northern attention turned from the South, and the federal government largely left 
the white South to itself as its leaders reconstituted their society around the 
principle of white supremacy. If there was any recognition of the deep irony that a 
central tool for building the Jim Crow South was, in fact, Jim Crow law,39 it was 
generally explained away by emphasizing that these laws were simply reflecting 
already existent social commitments. Laws were following customs. Laws were 
not telling the people (or at least whites) to do anything they were not already 
disposed to do anyway.40 
Even social scientists who did not accept the deep conservatism of the 
Sumnerian folkways school often accepted its basic skepticism toward the capacity 
of law. One of the leading social scientists of the early twentieth century was 
Robert E. Park, who, like Sumner, had little faith that social reform could work 
when it opposed established, “natural,” dynamics of behavior and custom. In a 
1935 essay, Park wrote:  
 
the political process can only proceed in a relatively orderly way in so far 
as it generates political power and authority capable of enforcing a 
certain degree of order and discipline until a new equilibrium has been 
achieved and the changes which the new programs initiated have been 
assimilated, digested and incorporated with the folkways of the original 
and historic society.41  
                                                
37 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN 
DEMOCRACY 1049 (1944). Segregationists who rejected the anti-religious connotations of 
Social Darwinism could replicate its status-quo enforcing benefits by substituting the hand 
of God for the mechanism of natural selection. As the Richmond Times declared in 1900: 
“God Almighty drew the color line and it cannot be obliterated.” C. VANN WOODWARD, 
THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 81 (1955). 
38 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25–26 (1883). 
39 “What is particularly ironic is that while Northern opinion was rejecting legislation 
as an instrument of social change, Southern legislators were busy enacting one Jim Crow 
law after another, all consciously designed to buttress the white-supremacy system and to 
perpetuate regional attitudes of prejudice and hostility toward the Negro.” Will Maslow, 
The Uses of Law in the Struggle for Equality, 22 SOC. RESEARCH 297, 297–98 (1955). 
40 See generally GILBERT T. STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW 
348–53 (1910) (describing segregation laws as reinforcing customary practices). 
41 MYRDAL, supra note 37, at 1050 (quoting Robert E. Park, Social Planning and 
Human Nature, PUBLICATIONS OF THE AM. SOC. SOC’Y, Aug. 1935, at 28). 
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Such observations held with particular force when it came to race relations. The 
racial status quo, he suggested, “might comprise . . . all those situations in which 
some relatively stable equilibrium between competing races has been achieved and 
in which the resulting social order has become fixed in custom and tradition.”42 
Racial prejudice, in this model, served a necessary role in “preserv[ing] the social 
order and the social distances upon which that order rests.”43 To introduce laws 
interfering with these natural and necessary prejudices would be foolhardy. 
The courts and the legal academy were dominated by a sense of fatalism 
toward the entire concept of civil rights law—or any law that attempted to remake 
existing social arrangements by regulating interpersonal relations directly. British 
jurist James Bryce, a close observer of American society and governance, 
embraced the Sumnerian line when he proclaimed in a 1902 lecture: “As regards 
social relations, law can do but little in the way of expressing the view the State 
takes of how its members should behave to one another. Good feeling and good 
manners cannot by imposed by statute.”44 Indeed, a fatalism toward the force of 
law was evident in practically all the great American legal figures of the day. 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in the words of one biographer, “did not 
believe that law could change the attitudes and practices of a culture. He believed 
the reverse, that law was a product of those attitudes and practices.”45 Holmes’s 
tendency toward fatalism at times echoed the sentiments of social Darwinists.46 In 
Giles v. Harris,47 a 1903 case involving the denial of voting rights to African 
Americans in Alabama, Holmes explained that a holding on behalf of the petitioner 
would be futile—it would risk being nothing more than an “empty form.”48 The 
Giles decision and a follow-up decision denying money damages to the petitioner49 
                                                
42 Id. (quoting Robert E. Park, The Nature of Race Relations, in RACE RELATIONS 
AND THE RACE PROBLEM 3–4 (Edgar T. Thompson, ed., Greenwood Press 1969) (1939)). 
43 Robert E. Park, The Concept of Social Distance, in 1 RACE AND CULTURE: THE 
COLLECTED PAPERS OF ROBERT EZRA PARK 260 (1950); see also Philip Gleason, 
Americans All: World War II and the Shaping of American Identity, 43 REV. POL. 483, 
495–98 (1981) (summarizing Park’s benign view of prejudice). 
44 MYRDAL, supra note 37, at 574 (quoting JAMES BRYCE, THE RELATIONS OF THE 
ADVANCED AND THE BACKWARD RACES OF MANKIND 43 (1902)). 
45 G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER 
SELF 342–43 (1993). 
46 Holmes’ private writings included observations such as “I see the inevitable 
everywhere,” 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES 
AND HAROLD J. LASKI 1916–1935, at 230 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) [hereinafter 
HOLMES-LASKI], “I do accept a ‘rough equation between isness and oughtness,’” id. at 948, 
and his famous proclamation: “if my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them,” 1 
HOLMES-LASKI, supra at 249. See generally Yosal Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 213, 243–56 (1964) (describing and criticizing Holmes’ detachment from 
popular affairs). 
47 189 U.S. 475 (1903). 
48 Id. at 488. 
49 Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146, 166 (1904). 
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were “among the Court’s most candid confessions of limited power,” according to 
legal historian Michael Klarman.50 These decisions “suggest that even plain 
constitutional violations during peacetime may go unredressed in the face of 
hostile public opinion.”51 
A classic articulation of this chastened vision of the law came in an address 
Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe Pound delivered to the Pennsylvania Bar 
Association in 1916, titled “The Limits of Effective Legal Action.”52 Pound 
delivered a warning to those Progressive reformers who would ask too much of the 
law. There were considerable risks to “over-ambitious plans to regulate every 
phase of human action by law” pressed by those who argue for “continual resort to 
law to supply the deficiencies of other agencies of social control” and who 
“attempt[] to govern by means of law things which in their nature do not admit of 
objective treatment and external coercion.”53 Pound cautioned, “In the wake of 
ambitious social programs calling for more and more interference with every 
relation of life, dissatisfaction with law, criticism of legal and judicial institutions, 
and suspicion as to the purposes of the lawyer become universal.”54 The end result 
is pervasive nonenforcement of the law—what Pound famously labeled as “the 
divergence between the law in the books and the law in action”55—which “is in 
reality a problem of the intrinsic limitations upon effective legal action.”56 “The 
life of the law is in its enforcement,”57 Pound declared, and the law should not be 
used “to register the protest of society against wrong.”58 For laws to be properly 
enforced, people must be motivated to follow the law by something more than “the 
abstract content of the rule and its conformity to an ideal justice of an ideal of 
social interest.”59 
The primary targets of Dean Pound’s criticism were Progressives who sought 
to repudiate the conservative ideology of the social Darwinists. The era was 
marked by legislative efforts to alleviate some of the harsh consequences of 
unfettered capitalism as well as to regulate the social behavior of the lower classes, 
particularly the newly arrived immigrants. Although Pound worried that these 
efforts went too far, reformers were energized in their battle against Sumner’s 
dismissal of efforts to remake society as dangerous pipe dreams. One of the major 
goals of the Progressives was to use the law to further their efforts to help the 
downtrodden. Progressive-era legal reforms often began relatively small, with 
municipal-level reforms, but in the first two decades of the twentieth century 
                                                
50 KLARMAN, supra note 28, at 36. 
51 Id. at 37. 
52 Roscoe Pound, The Limits of Effective Legal Action, 3 A.B.A. J. 55 (1917). 
53 Id. at 56. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 63; see also Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 
12  (1910). 
56 Pound, supra note 52, at 57. 
57 Id. at 70. 
58 Id. at 69. 
59 Id. 
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reformers mobilized a national campaign that culminated in federal legislation and 
several constitutional amendments. 
But the effect of the Progressives’ commitment to legal reform on race 
relations was limited. When laws were passed that were intended to affect racial 
practices, they were generally in line with the prevalent racist attitudes of the day. 
Jim Crow laws were part of the Progressive agenda in the South.60 There was not 
sufficient public support for civil rights legislation. Even among those who might 
have held some sympathy for the principle of civil rights, many assumed that race 
relations were simply different from other social practices—they were more 
emotional, more entrenched, and thus less amendable to legal reform. In terms of 
social policy, there arose the idea of racial exceptionalism: general rules guiding 
the relationship between law and society did not apply in the same way when racial 
relations were at issue. Even as Progressives enthusiastically called upon the law, 
in Pound’s words, “ambitiously to cover the whole field of social control,”61 social 
Darwinism remained a powerful presumption in the area of racial policy.62 
This is not to say that liberals of the period were universally skeptical of the 
capacity of law to ameliorate the harshest elements of life for African Americans 
during the ignominious heyday of Jim Crow America. The NAACP, formed in 
1909, was explicitly dedicated to using the force of the law to protect the interests 
of black Americans. Efforts to pass federal antilynching legislation were 
periodically made in the interwar years. Yet even among those who recognized 
that government could do far more to help African Americans, many emphasized 
an important qualification regarding the kind of legal reform that could be effective 
in this area. As leaders of the NAACP and other civil rights advocates pressed for 
increased judicial intervention, other liberals argued that court decisions were 
limited in what they could accomplish in this area—an argument that dovetailed 
nicely with the Progressive presumption in favor of judicial deference to legislative 
action that coalesced with the liberal attacks on the Lochner Court. This preference 
for legislation over court order was most frequently justified on the grounds of 
democratic principles—allowing the elected branches to take the lead in reform 
efforts made government more accountable and responsive to the people. But it 
                                                
60 See, e.g., WOODWARD, supra note 37, at 75 (“[T]he typical progressive reformer 
rode to power in the South on a disfranchising or white-supremacy movement . . . . Racism 
was conceived of by some as the very foundation of Southern progressivism.”). 
61 Pound, supra note 52, at 65. 
62 Even rare civil rights victories during this period could be framed as doing nothing 
to challenge skepticism toward the efficacy of civil rights law. For example, in ruling 
residential segregation laws unconstitutional, the Supreme Court explained:  
 
That there exists a serious and difficult problem arising from a feeling of 
race hostility which the law is powerless to control, and to which it must give a 
measure of consideration, may be freely admitted. But its solution cannot be 
promoted by depriving citizens of their constitutional rights and privileges.  
 
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 80–81 (1917) (emphasis added). 
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also recognized the particular efficacy of statutes as opposed to judicial rulings. 
For example, even as he questioned the wisdom of issuing a decision in Giles that 
would be nothing more than an “empty form,” Holmes emphasized that “relief 
from a great political wrong, if done, as alleged, by the people of a state and the 
state itself, must be given by them or by the legislative and political department of 
the government of the United States.”63 Holmes’s protégé and future Supreme 
Court Justice Felix Frankfurter questioned the social effects of judicial decrees in 
an essay entitled, “Can the Supreme Court Guarantee Toleration?”64 “The real 
battles of liberalism are not won in the Supreme Court,” Frankfurter contended.65 
“Only a persistent, positive translation of the liberal faith into the thoughts and acts 
of the community is the real reliance against the unabated temptation to straitjacket 
the human mind.”66 From this conception, law, to be effective, must derive from 
and reinforce culture, “the thoughts and acts of the community.” The closer the 
connection between law and society, the stronger and more effective the law is. In 
this vision of law, which still contained a generous dose of Sumnerian folkways 
ideology, legislative action could be effective because it necessarily reflected 
popular attitudes. Federal courts on the other hand were the most detached from 
immediate circumstances, and therefore had to be the most circumspect with their 
intervention into social relations. 
 
B.  Prohibition and the Problem of “Legislating Morality” 
 
In the years following World War II, as racial liberals fought to mobilize 
support for legal reform, they found themselves battling against not only the 
traditional obstacles for civil rights—entrenched racism, intransigent apathy, and 
stubborn ignorance—but also the ghost of the failed crusade to rid the nation of 
alcohol. No event of the twentieth century gave greater comfort to skeptics of the 
power of the law to shape social norms than the ignominious failure of Prohibition. 
Here was the perfect example of an idealistic movement for social change that 
turned to the law to force the entire nation to conform to a certain ideal of the 
good—and it backfired in glorious fashion. In its wake was left a generation of 
liberals who were forced to reconsider the problems of enforcing positive law that 
ran contrary to the deeply felt commitments of a large segment of the population.67 
Prohibition, lamented James Truslow Adams, was just the latest and most 
egregious example of a disturbing pattern of American history in which reformers 
“believe[] that their ideals should be expressed in the form of law, regardless of the 
                                                
63 Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903).  
64  Felix Frankfurter, Can the Supreme Court Guarantee Toleration?, NEW REPUBLIC, 
June 17, 1925, at 89. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 See Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American 
Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 
(2006). Much of this section is indebted to Professor Post’s comprehensive and incisive 
article. 
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practical question of whether such laws could be enforced . . . . Because we have 
ceased to have any respect for law we allow any sort of law to be passed.”68 
One of the more remarkable facts of the failure of Prohibition was that the 
temperance movement had secured not just the majorities necessary to pass local 
and eventually national regulations, but the supermajorities across the nation 
necessary to amend the Constitution.69 Yet this support proved transitory. 
Prohibition, almost from the day it became the law of the land, began losing 
support. Not only did it face the self-evident obstacle to trying to force a populace 
to stop doing something that many, many people were not about to give up, 
Prohibition also posed a dilemma for Progressives who sought to portray the 
regulatory state as a beneficial and benign part of modern society. But the 
increasingly unpopularity of Prohibition was giving social regulation a bad name 
—it risked turning the nascent administrative state into a police state.70 Prohibition 
also forced upon Progressives the stubborn persistence of custom on defining the 
limits of the enforceable law.71  
The “noble experiment” in legalized morality led to a whole new array of 
problems. “The question is frequently asked,” wrote James Truslow Adams in 
1928, “Is the Eighteenth Amendment making us a nation of lawbreakers?”72 Few 
would take issue with Adams’s conclusion that “the Amendment is helping to 
break down respect for law itself.”73 As outlined in the report of the National 
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (commonly known as the 
Wickersham Commission), Prohibition encouraged political corruption, created a 
thriving bootlegging economy, strained the criminal justice system, and often 
failed to receive necessary state enforcement. Not only did the report find 
increased consumption of alcohol after 1920, but it warned that the current 
situation encouraged a general disrespect for the law.74 President Warren Harding 
declared the inability to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment “the most 
demoralizing factor in our public life.”75 
Prohibition’s failure left its mark on future projects of social reform. Historian 
David E. Kyvig explains that Prohibition “helped discredit the view that society 
could be reformed and uplifted simply through passage of the proper statutes.”76 
Making new laws was quite different than actually enforcing new laws, ex-
                                                
68 James Truslow Adams, Our Lawless Heritage, ATLANTIC, Dec. 1928, at 740.  
69 The striking success of the prohibition movement, culminating in the Eighteenth 
Amendment, can be attributed in large part to its ability to capitalize on the reformist 
enthusiasms unleashed by World War I. See Post, supra note 67, at 11–18.  
70 See, id. at 19–20. 
71 Id. at 20–21. 
72 Adams, supra note 68, at 732.  
73 Id. at 732. 
74 United States National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, No. 71, 
H.R. Doc. No. 722, at 7, 21, 155 (1931). 
75 Warren G. Harding, President of the United States, Second Annual Message (Dec. 
8, 1922), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29563. 
76 DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 200 (2000).  
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president of Yale Arthur Twining Hadley explained in 1925. “Conscience and 
public opinion enforce the laws; the police suppress the exceptions.”77 Therefore, 
“government authorities must be careful not to go beyond what public opinion 
demands in the laws which it makes or the acts which it requires.”78 Supreme 
Court Justice Harlan F. Stone warned of the  
 
child-like and implicit faith in the efficacy of legislation to bring about 
social Utopia. . . . Forgetting that social custom and the average moral 
standards of the community are more potent in the control of human 
conduct than formal law, we nevertheless seem to regard statute making 
as the chief and only ultimate agency of social reform and the never 
failing means for the minute regulation and control of all human 
activities.79  
 
Just as Prohibition was doomed to failure in the cities and within certain immigrant 
communities, so might civil rights legislation be doomed to failure in the South. 
The experience of Prohibition reinforced the measured skepticism toward salvation 
through legal reform that characterized the writings of legal scholars and social 
scientists. Its echoes would be heard in the emerging civil rights debate of the 
coming decades. 
 
C.  Intergroup Education and Antiprejudice Campaigns 
 
One reason for the longevity of the “folkways” assumptions about the relation 
between law and race relations was the way they were adapted to fit various 
agendas and political ideologies. These assumptions were, of course, a central 
element in the laissez faire ideology of conservative social Darwinists who saw all 
legal efforts to promote social welfare as dangerous meddling in the natural course 
of social development (which inevitably included social divisions). “[I]n the 
folkways,” Sumner wrote, “whatever is, is right.”80 But the folkways premise did 
not necessarily lead to conservative, pessimistic conclusions. By the early decades 
of the twentieth century, a far more moderate version of the folkways school of 
thought emerged, promoted by groups that hoped to improve relations between 
racial, ethnic, and religious groups. Skeptical of legal reform as a path toward 
intergroup harmony, proponents of folkways liberalism believed progress would 
come from directly addressing destructive customs and beliefs through education. 
By the 1920s and 1930s, campaigns to promote intergroup understanding and 
                                                
77 Arthur Twining Hadley, Law Making and Law Enforcement, HARPERS Nov. 1925, 
at 641. 
78 Id. at 642. 
79 Post, supra note 67, at 76 n.269 (quoting Harlan F. Stone, Annual Address of the 
Bar Association of the State of New Hampshire: Obedience to Law and Social Change, in 5 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 27, 37 (1925)). 
80 SUMNER, supra note 9, at 28.  
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lessen prejudice would become the centerpiece of the liberal campaign to improve 
American race relations. 
Racial reformers in the interwar period, working within an ideological 
environment in which it was widely accepted that bold civil rights measures would 
be counterproductive, created one of the most important movements for racial 
progress of the day. The “intergroup” or “tolerance” movement was a loose 
coalition of like-minded reform efforts found in both the North and the South from 
the 1920s into the 1940s when it was at the forefront of interracial progressive 
reform.81 The movement achieved its greatest institutional success in organizations 
such as the Commission on Interracial Cooperation, formed in 1919 and 
reorganized in 1944 as the Southern Regional Council, and the Southern 
Conference for Human Welfare, formed in 1938.82 By the early postwar period, the 
intergroup movement had expanded to include hundreds of national agencies and 
thousands of local ones.83 The goal of these efforts was to reduce prejudice through 
educating individuals to appreciate difference and also to learn that many 
suspected differences between groups had no basis in reality.84 By better 
understanding others, whether through direct contact with other groups or through 
education, tolerationists hoped that stereotypes would be undermined, and a new 
generation of tolerant American citizens created. While the predominant focus of 
this movement during its formative years in the 1920s was on reducing tensions 
based on ethnicity and religion (where they had their greatest successes), by the 
1940s it was increasingly addressing racial antagonism.85 
Among African American lawyers, the interwar years saw a commitment to 
volunteerism and intraracial self-help, which was often accompanied by a 
skeptical—or at least wary—attitude toward legal reform.86 “The voluntarist 
impulse,” writes legal historian Kenneth Mack, was a reaction to the legalization of  
 
the social mores of the majority of the population that did not support 
equal citizenship for blacks. If public opinion was opposed to granting 
legal equality to blacks, and if law followed public opinion, then one 
solution was the voluntarist one—simply to be let alone to concentrate 
on intraracial development.87  
                                                
81 See GOODWIN WATSON, ACTION FOR UNITY 5–24 (1947). 
82 Id. at 62. 
83 Id. at 1–24.  
84 Id. at 25. 
85 See, e.g., id.; ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, JR., THE REDUCTION OF INTERGROUP TENSIONS: 
A SURVEY OF RESEARCH ON PROBLEMS OF ETHNIC, RACIAL, AND RELIGIOUS GROUP 
RELATIONS 51–66 (1947); Frank W. Baldau, Intergroup Relations and Action Programs, 2 
J. SOC. ISSUES 27, 30 (1946). See generally NICHOLAS V. MONTALTO, A HISTORY OF THE 
INTERCULTURAL EDUCATION MOVEMENT, 1924–1941 (1982); DIANA SELIG, AMERICANS 
ALL: THE CULTURAL GIFTS MOVEMENT (2008); STUART SVONKIN, JEWS AGAINST 
PREJUDICE: AMERICAN JEWS AND THE FIGHT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES (1997). 
86 See Mack, supra note 13, at 277–81. 
87 Id. at 297. 
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Some leading black lawyers accepted a basic tenet of Sumner’s folkways 
analysis—that, “the causal arrow ran from social change to legal change rather 
than the other way around.”88 Yet the fight to change the law was sometimes still 
important. Civil rights lawyers recognized litigation and lobbying efforts as 
offering benefits above and beyond any courtroom victories that might result, as 
they could help mobilize and educate the black community.89 
Intergroup educational efforts accelerated during the war years. “[B]y making 
the need for national unity more compelling,” one historian noted, World War II 
“intensified efforts that were already under way to cut down prejudice, improve 
intergroup relations, and promote greater toleration of diversity.”90 “The solution 
of our race problem,” noted historian John Hope Franklin in 1944, “is education: 
education of the whites that they may understand that the denial of rights to 
minorities is just as dangerous to democracy in the United States as it is in 
Europe.”91  
Southern liberals were particularly committed to the idea that racial progress 
would come through education rather than legal reform. They held onto this 
commitment after northern racial liberals had largely accepted legal reform as a 
necessary and proper tool for breaking the back of Jim Crow.92 The educationalist 
approach suited the more moderate temperament of southern liberals. It allowed 
for a gradual transition away from Jim Crow, taking into account the high psychic 
costs such a transition would have for white southerners and avoiding any sudden 
breaks that might lead to violent backlash. It also addressed a key concern for 
southern liberals, the preservation of states’ rights. Intergroup cooperation groups 
could be effective without challenging state autonomy—without resorting to 
“outside interference”—something that all southerners hoped to avoid. This 
approach bypassed the difficult choice between supporting racial progress and 
standing up against federal encroachment on state power. Of course, the 
educationalist approach also held a pragmatic element for southern liberals. They 
recognized that southern states and localities were unlikely to pass legal reform, 
and that their greatest opportunity came through community educational 
programs—which, they believed, would eventually lead to local and state civil 
rights reform. 
                                                
88 Id. at 298. 
89 See id.; MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST 
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Into the post–World War II period, even as the legalist approach gained 
prominence in national discussions of racial reform, antilegalist sentiment 
remained strong among those who professed themselves interested in promoting 
the cause of racial equality, in the South and elsewhere. When the New York state 
legislature was debating landmark employment discrimination legislation in 1945, 
Oswald Garrison Villard, a leading liberal voice in discussions of race relations, 
attacked the new law, declaring it “far wiser to rely on the force of slow but 
steadily growing public opinion” rather than legislation.93 A poll taken in 1948 
found that four out of every ten people surveyed believed that “people can’t be 
forced to change deep-rooted prejudices by passing laws.”94 As late as 1955, in the 
period immediately following Brown, Will Maslow, the director of the American 
Jewish Congress’s Commission on Law and Social Action, summarized the 
skepticism toward the capacity of the law found in Plessy and the writing of 
Sumner and warned: “The doctrine persists.”95 
So when the postwar generation of racial liberals launched their campaign to 
elevate the place of the law in the debate over how to deal with America’s racial 
problem, they were taking on not only segregationists who saw “racial instincts” 
and prejudices as natural and inevitable, but also a powerful strand of liberalism 
that saw the race problem as necessitating, first and foremost, education, exposure, 
perhaps even some forms of indoctrination—but not a full-blown civil rights 
reform effort.  
 
III.  THE CASE FOR THE LAW 
 
In the world laboratory of the sociologist, as in the more secluded 
laboratories of the physicist and chemist, it is the successful experiment 
which is decisive and not the thousand-and-one failures which preceded 
it. More is learned from the single success than from the multiple 
failures. A single success proves it can be done.96 
 
The antilegalist sentiment toward race relations of the Plessy Court and the 
social Darwinists remained strong well into the twentieth century, in both its 
conservative and reformist manifestations. Skepticism toward the efficacy of civil 
                                                
93 C. C. Burlingham et al., Letter to the Editor, Faults Found in Ives Bill: 
Discrimination, It Is Held, Cannot Be Overcome by Legal Means, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 
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rights reform was a central line of defense for defenders of Jim Crow through the 
civil rights movement. This same skepticism steered racial progressives in the 
1920s and 1930s toward educationalist projects, rather than legal reform, and it 
remained a central tenet of southern liberalism into the 1960s. These assumptions 
would have to be overcome if the nation were to be steered on a new course of a 
national commitment to civil rights, even in the face of considerable resistance in 
the white South. 
The creation of a compelling, persuasive ideology of civil rights reform had 
two elements, each aimed at assumptions of the folkways school of thought. First 
was to destabilize the belief that racial hierarchies were natural and inflexible and 
that racial prejudice was a natural component of the human condition.97 Second 
was to press the argument that legal commands can be particularly effective in 
transforming social relations.98 These two projects were necessarily connected. The 
more malleable the attitudes and customs of Jim Crow, the more readily outside 
pressures, such as a federal law, could reform these attitudes and customs. And the 
more powerful the law, the deeper into Jim Crow race relations it could penetrate. 
Thus, the case for the capacity of the law made these two interlocking arguments: 
iniquitous racial customs and prejudices were not nearly as entrenched as was 
generally assumed (and certainly not the solid rock of Sumnerian folkways); and 
wide-scale legal reform was the most effective way to lead the nation away from 
its damaging tradition of racial inequality. 
 
A.  Myrdal’s Critique of the Folkways Principle 
 
Gunnar Myrdal’s monumental 1944 study of race relations in the United 
States, An American Dilemma,99 has often been heralded as marking a major 
breakthrough in the creation of intellectual foundations of the modern civil rights 
movement. At the time of its publication, it was widely recognized as a definitive 
statement on the pervasive costs of racial discrimination, including segregation, on 
American society. Hardly a statement on race relations was issued in the decade 
following its publication without an appreciative reference to the thousand-plus 
page study by the Swedish sociologist and his team of researchers.100 Most 
famously, Chief Justice Earl Warren referenced the work in the controversial 
footnote eleven of the Brown decision.101 Yet for all the thoroughness of analysis 
and research that went into An American Dilemma, it failed to recognize the central 
role that law—particularly federal legislative, executive, and judicial action—
would play in the struggle for civil rights.  
                                                
97 See infra Part III.A. 
98 See infra Parts III.B and III.C. 
99 See MYRDAL, supra note 37. 
100 See WALTER A. JACKSON, GUNNAR MYRDAL AND AMERICA’S CONSCIENCE: 
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In the two-prong attack on folkways assumptions that racial liberals fought in 
the postwar years, Myrdal made invaluable contributions to the first, arguing that 
the nation was ready and willing to abandon its racist commitments, and that there 
was a deep (if recessive) national commitment to egalitarianism, which he labeled 
the “American Creed.”102 At times, Myrdal seemed to believe that the key support 
for Jim Crow was simple ignorance—southerners did not recognize the American 
tradition of equality and assumed that racial hierarchies were necessary to safety 
and prosperity; northerners had little appreciation of the systematic refutation of 
the American ideal of equality taking place in the Jim Crow South.103 So the path 
forward, according to An American Dilemma, lay in knowledge: in better schools; 
in better media coverage, leading to more publicity of what was happening in the 
South; and, above all, in the application of scientific expertise to the race problem. 
“In a sense, the social engineering of the coming epoch will be nothing but the 
drawing of practical conclusions from the teaching of social science that ‘human 
nature’ is changeable and that human deficiencies and unhappiness are, in large 
degree, preventable.”104 
Myrdal gave little attention, however, to the critical second prong of racial 
legalism—the primacy of law in the assault on Jim Crow. Unlike the generation of 
civil rights supporters who came to power and influence in the years following An 
American Dilemma, Myrdal was tentative in relying on law as the catalyst for 
instigating this great American reawakening. He did not ignore the potential of 
civil rights reform. He lashed out, for example, at the “intellectual defeatism” of 
American sociologists, who, still under the influence of Sumner, were overly 
skeptical “towards the possibility of inducing social change by means of 
legislation.”105 Yet he qualified these conclusions with references to a “general 
distrust of politics and legislation that is widespread among the educated classes of 
Americans.”106 He emphasized an American tradition of disrespect for the rule of 
law, particularly in the South,107 and he warned of a distinctly American “desire to 
regulate human behavior tyrannically by means of formal laws” citing failed 
efforts to legislate against drinking as an example.108 If laws were to work, they 
would have to be carefully considered; they would need to be framed and 
monitored by trained experts; and they would need to be part of a multiprong 
                                                
102 See MYRDAL, supra note 37, at 8–9, 526, 568.  
103 Id. at 44–49. 
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project of social engineering. “We are entering an era where fact-finding and 
scientific theories of causal relations will be seen as instrumental in planning 
controlled social change”—these are “new urgent tasks for social engineering.”109 
While Myrdal certainly saw a role for legal reform (law was “a weapon in the caste 
struggle”110) he placed his greatest hope for change in a national “educational 
offensive against racial intolerance.”111 Myrdal was more an educationalist than a 
legalist. In the end, he put far more faith in education and intergroup consultation 
than in legal compulsion.  
As valuable as Myrdal’s diagnostic analysis of American race relations was, 
the failure of An American Dilemma to engage at any length with law’s capacity to 
change racial dynamics limited its utility to the postwar generation of civil rights 
reformers. Robert MacIver, a Columbia University sociologist, highlighted these 
limitations when he criticized Myrdal for failing to offer a tangible plan for reform. 
Myrdal’s basic premise, MacIver explained, was “that a more precise knowledge 
of the facts will of itself provide the answer to our question.”112 Simply learning 
more about the problem, Myrdal seemed to assume, would somehow solve it. But, 
for postwar civil rights advocates, this faith in exposure to facts and the slow 
processes of education was not enough. Works such as An American Dilemma, 
MacIver noted, “convey no message to the framers of social policy . . . .”113 
Similarly, sociologist Robert Merton warned, “One does not expect a paranoiac to 
abandon his hard-won distortions and delusions upon being informed that they are 
altogether groundless . . . . Nor will a continuing ‘educational campaign’ itself 
destroy racial prejudice and discrimination.”114 What was needed, Merton 
explained, were “deliberate institutional controls.”115 Prejudices “can be helped 
over the threshold of oblivion, not by insisting that it is unreasonable and unworthy 
of them to survive, but by cutting off their sustenance now provided by certain 
institutions of our society.”116 And the way to reform institutions was to change the 
law. 
 
B.  The Turn to the Law 
 
Even as An American Dilemma dissected the problem, liberal scholars and 
activists were constructing a new working consensus on the law-versus-education 
question. The educationalist position—that progress would come through 
reeducation to lessen prejudicial attitudes—was surpassed in the postwar era by the 
                                                
109 Id. at 1023. 
110 Id. at 1009. Myrdal also recognized that laws played a role in the creation of Jim 
Crow race relations, id. at 580, foreshadowing the point that C. Vann Woodward would 
more fully develop. See infra Part III.E.  
111 MYRDAL, supra note 37, at 48–49.  
112 ROBERT M. MACIVER, THE MORE PERFECT UNION 17 (1947).  
113 Id. at 18. 
114 Merton, supra note 96, at 197.  
115 Id. at 210. 
116 Id. 
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growing commitment to legal reform. This development was made possible by the 
efforts of racial liberals who adroitly promoted their newfound respect for the 
power of laws to remake race relations. 
With the war’s end, as the American people turned toward the challenges of 
demobilization and reconversion to a peace-time society, as they tried to come to 
terms with the lessons of their battle with fascism, and with the Holocaust, and as 
they looked at the new national security challenges of the Cold War, the 
intellectual battle lines in the struggle against Jim Crow shifted. Faith in laws and 
the institutions of government, especially the federal government, as the necessary 
locus for efforts of social reform has roots in many events in American history, 
from the Civil War to the campaigns of the Populists and Progressives, but for 
postwar civil rights proponents, the New Deal experience was central. Many 
leaders in the racial liberal movement worked in government during the New Deal 
and war years, including not only lawyers but also social scientists, and their 
experience in using the law to regulate economic relations led them to 
optimistically assess the possibility of doing the same for race relations.117 Myrdal 
wrote that the New Deal legitimized a commitment “to use the state as an 
instrument for induced social change,”118 a theme that President Truman 
emphasized when he sought to include federal civil rights protections as a 
component of his “Fair Deal” program. “The extension of civil rights today,” 
Truman told the 1947 convention of the NAACP, “means, not protection of the 
people against the Government, but protection of the people by the Government. . . 
. Our National Government must show the way.”119 
This legalistic turn also had roots in the experience of the Second World War. 
The lessons many liberals learned from Nazi Germany was that the best defense 
America had in avoiding a similar fate was a faith in the American legal system.120 
The conflation of fascism and Soviet Communism under the rubric of 
“totalitarianism” extended this heightened linkage of democracy with the rule of 
                                                
117 See JOHN P. JACKSON, JR., SOCIAL SCIENTISTS FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE: MAKING THE 
CASE AGAINST SEGREGATION 40–42 (2001) (noting the expansion of social science in the 
realm of public policy); MYRDAL, supra note 37, at 1023; SVONKIN, supra note 85, at 83 
(stating that New Deal experiences pushed lawyers toward “progressive social change”). 
118 MYRDAL, supra note 37, at 74. 
119  Harry S Truman, Address Before the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People (June 29, 1947), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid= 
12686. 
120 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 247–68 (1992); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE 
CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 
233–72 (1973); Carl Landauer, Deliberating Speed: Totalitarian Anxieties and Postwar 
Legal Thought, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 171 (2000); Richard Primus, A Brooding 
Omnipresence: Totalitarianism in Postwar Constitutional Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 423, 
447–50 (1996). 
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law into the early Cold War period.121 Americans thankfully praised the sturdy, 
stabilizing nature of their political system, marking a sharp change in the 
discussion from Myrdal’s descriptions of the nation’s “anarchistic” and lawless 
tendencies. Legal historian Kermit Hall nicely captured this development when he 
wrote of “an awakening realization of the instrumental relationship between legal 
and social change” in this period.122 
This willingness to look to the law as the basis for national strength in a world 
filled with totalitarian threats was further reinforced by the fact that requirements 
of American foreign policy during the Cold War spurred civil rights reform at 
home. Simply put, the United States was embarrassed by Soviet propaganda, 
which exploited racial discrimination in the nation that portrayed itself as the 
center of the “free world.” To avoid alienating potential allies, particularly in the 
Third World, U.S. policymakers often expressed a willingness to support civil 
rights. But, to serve the needs of American foreign policy, this reform needed to be 
national in scope (preferably linked in some way to the federal government) and 
highly publicized. This was a battle of image as much as (or, perhaps, more than) 
real change.123 Community antiprejudice efforts and intergroup understanding 
campaigns did not fit this bill; federal civil rights reform—legislation, executive 
orders, and Supreme Court decisions—did. With pressures both internal and 
external, it is not surprising that this generation would reevaluate previous 
assumptions about the potential for the law to positively impact the social 
challenges of the day.  
All of these factors created a postwar generation of liberal social scientists 
who at times displayed an almost utopian faith in the power of the law to structure 
behavior. “[T]o control man’s social environment is to control man. This is the 
main task of the law,” pronounced the authors of a 1947 law review article.124 The 
major sins of racial oppression were, with increasing frequency, attributed less to 
underlying attitudes and more to legalities. If, as one scholar concluded, “[t]he 
chief device of racial segregation in the South is law,” 125 then the proper remedy 
was self evident. At times, this faith in the law bordered on the naïve; at times, it 
suggested a pragmatic appraisal of the instrumental potential of law-centered 
rhetoric. 
 
                                                
121 Les K. Adler & Thomas G. Paterson, Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany 
and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930’s–1950’s, 75 AM. HIST. 
REV. 1046 (1970). 
122 KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 266 (1989). 
123 See DUDZIAK, supra note 7. 
124 Sidney Post Simpson & Ruth Field, Social Engineering Through Law: The Need 
for a School of Applied Jurisprudence, 22 N.Y.U. L. Q. REV. 145, 145 (1947). 
125 Ira De A. Reid, Southern Ways, SURVEY GRAPHIC, Jan. 1947, at 39.  
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C.  The Case for Law’s Capacity 
 
The rise of the legalist perspective came from a relatively straightforward 
insight: attitudes can follow actions. By this insight, postwar racial liberals sought 
to completely overturn the assumptions of folkways ideology. Social Darwinists 
argued that people have a relatively stable set of beliefs and customs from which 
their behavior derived; therefore, these folkways could not be (and should not be) 
reformed by legal command.126 By contrast, postwar social scientists, following 
Myrdal, saw much less stability in popular customs and beliefs; they were largely a 
product of habits and actions and behavior, all of which could be changed by 
changing legal requirements. Once people start acting differently—when they are 
required to follow employment antidiscrimination regulations, for instance—their 
attitudes toward racial minorities will change as well. Law itself was a major 
creator of attitudes; law had a crucial role in the education of society.  
Alternately, some argued that beneficial social change could arrive without 
necessarily draining citizens of internalized racist sentiments. Robert MacIver 
argued that the central target for government action should be discrimination (i.e., 
actions), rather than prejudice (i.e., beliefs): “Wherever the direct attack is feasible, 
that is, the attack on discrimination itself, it is more promising than the indirect 
attack, that is the attack on prejudice as such. It is more effective to challenge 
conditions than to challenge attitudes or feelings.”127 MacIver here was making an 
analytical move central to the racial liberals. Whereas the premise of folkways 
thought was that prejudicial beliefs were the fundamental issue and that any 
“direct” approach to the problem of racial inequality would need to change these 
attitudes, presumably through reeducation efforts, legalists reversed the dynamic. 
Now it was the discriminatory action that was the fundamental problem, and the 
beliefs were secondary to this action. Thus, a direct attack on racial inequality 
meant passing laws that would require people to act differently—to stop 
discriminating rather than necessarily to stop hating. 
But for the more optimistic of racial liberals, MacIver’s theory of racial 
progress did not go far enough; he was too skeptical of the ability for changed 
circumstances and actions to affect attitudes. And once people stop discriminating, 
once the legally imposed barriers that separated people were broken down, then the 
secondary benefits could be realized, namely the weakening of prejudice. So, in 
the end, the attack on discriminatory actions, these racial liberals argued, would in 
fact result in more egalitarian sentiments.128 And, following Myrdal’s premise, 
                                                
126 See, e.g., SUMNER, supra note 9, at 55–57, 77–78, 87.  
127 MACIVER, supra note 112, at 247. 
128 See, e.g., John P. Roche & Milton M. Gordon, Can Morality Be Legislated?, N.Y. 
TIMES MAGAZINE, May 22, 1955, at 47 (“In this more comprehensive analysis [of modern 
sociology], law itself is seen as a force which, in its impact, does more than prohibit or 
compel specific behavior. Indeed, in its operation, law actually provides the setting for 
types of social relationships—relationships which may have a profound effect on the very 
attitudes which are necessary to adequate enforcement of the statute in question.”). 
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these sentiments were lying just below the surface, waiting to be let loose. Or, in 
the words of B.R. Brazeal, former dean of Morehouse College, “Progressive 
democracy thrives on laws and juridical precedents which urge us, despite our 
mores, toward a greater recognition of human and social values.”129 As Will 
Maslow, perhaps the most persistent and influential advocate of the legalist 
position, explained, “in certain situations the absolute fiat of government is now 
deemed more effective than education in bringing about social change.”130 
One of the key points pressed by racial liberals was to complicate the 
traditional concept of “law.” The law-versus-education “dichotomy is a forced and 
unnatural one,” Maslow and Joseph B. Robison argued.131 “[L]aw itself is a form 
of education and education is the prerequisite to an effective use of law.”132 
Skepticism toward civil rights law “arises out of an outmoded notion that law is 
simply an extension of the policeman’s club and that punishment alone is too crude 
an instrument to deal with deeply rooted prejudices and patterns of behavior.”133 
But a recent generation of “social scientists have broadened our understanding of 
                                                
129 B.R. Brazeal, The Present Status and Programs of Fair Employment Practices 
Commissions – Federal, State, and Municipal, 20 J. NEGRO EDUC. 378, 397 (1951).  
130 Maslow, supra note 39, at 298. See also Shad Polier, Law, Conscience and 
Society, 6 L. GUILD REV. 490, 491 (1946) (“I believe that the reduction or elimination of 
discrimination will inevitably lead to the reduction of and make for the elimination of bias 
and prejudice. I submit that external attitudes and behavior influence internal convictions 
and emotions of normal men and women.”). 
One can see evidence of this shift of emphasis (as well as the impact of postwar civil 
rights victories) simply by looking at the topics of the annual yearbook of the Journal of 
Negro Education. The 1944 yearbook was dedicated “Education for Racial 
Understanding.” Martin D. Jenkins, Editorial Comment, 13 J. NEGRO EDUC. 265, 265 
(1944). By the early 1950s, the yearbooks focused on legal reform. Chas H. Thompson, 
Editorial Note, 20 J. NEGRO EDUC. 249, 249 (1951) (issue dedicated to “The American 
Negro and Civil Rights in 1950”); Chas H. Thompson, Editorial Note, 21 J. NEGRO EDUC. 
229, 229 (1952) (issue dedicated to “The Courts and Racial Integration in Education”). 
131 Maslow & Robison, supra note 2, at 363. 
132 Id.  See also PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO SECURE THESE 
RIGHTS 103 (1947) (“The argument is sometimes made that because prejudice and 
intolerance cannot be eliminated through legislation and government control we should 
abandon that action in favor of the long, slow, evolutionary effects of education and 
voluntary private efforts. We believe that this argument misses the point and that the choice 
it poses between legislation and education as to the means of improving civil rights is an 
unnecessary one. In our opinion, both approaches to the goal are valid, and are, moreover, 
essential to each other.”); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE VITAL CENTER: THE 
POLITICS OF FREEDOM 190 (1949) (“While we may not be able to repeal prejudice by law, 
yet law is an essential part of the enterprise of education which alone can end prejudice.”); 
LILLIAN SMITH, NOW IS THE TIME 19 (1955) (“[T]his process of bringing about change in 
laws, or deciding on the validity of old laws, is also an important means of educating the 
people whom these laws affect . . . .”). 
133 Maslow, supra note 39, at 298. 
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the causes of discrimination and of prejudice,” necessitating that “our conception 
of the role of law in a multigroup society . . . be revised drastically.”134 
In new findings in psychology, advocates of legally enforced integration were 
able to locate a scientific basis for their position. Racial liberals added specificity 
to the idea that law affected personal beliefs, particularly in the realm of 
segregation, when they began drawing on the sociological concept of “contact 
theory.” This theory, premised on the idea that increased interaction among diverse 
groups would lead to improved relations between these groups, had largely 
displaced notions prominent earlier in the century that assumed unnecessary 
interactions between different groups risked destabilizing society. The basis of 
contact theory was that ignorance produced prejudice, and the best remedy for 
ignorance was exposure and education. And here is where the law could play a 
role, since, as one scholar put it, “some kind of legal force is necessary to bring 
members of the two groups into a close enough relationship for the discriminators 
to learn from experience how inadequate their stereotypes have really been.”135 
Social psychologists quickly built an entire scholarly literature around contact 
theory. Numerous experiments in interracial living came to the conclusion that, 
under the proper circumstances, living in close contact made different groups more 
tolerant and less prejudiced;136 military137 and workplace138 integration studies 
offered much the same conclusion.139 
                                                
134 Id. See also Polier, supra note 130, at 490 (“[T]he significance of law is not alone 
in the control of those who do not hold certain convictions but also in the control of the 
actual behavior of the conviction-holder . . . . The power of the law is . . . in the 
crystallization of the moral values which exist within the majority itself, indeed within 
every individual.”). 
135 Gene Weltfish, Some Problems on Which We Need More Facts–and Some 
Implications for Action, 1 J. SOC. ISSUES 47, 52 (1945).   
136 See, e.g., TOM C. CLARK & PHILIP B. PERLMAN, PREJUDICE AND PROPERTY: AN 
HISTORIC BRIEF AGAINST RACIAL COVENANTS 84–85 (1948) (reprint of Justice Department 
amicus brief in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)); MORTON DEUTSCH & MARY 
EVANS COLLINS, INTERRACIAL HOUSING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF A SOCIAL 
EXPERIMENT 78–88 (1951); NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON SEGREGATION IN THE NATION’S 
CAPITAL, SEGREGATION IN WASHINGTON 37–38 (1948); PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON 
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 130, at 85–87; Charles Abrams, Our Chance for Democratic 
Housing, NATION, Aug. 16, 1947, at 160–62;Charles Abrams, Race Bias in Housing, 
NATION, July 19, 1947, at 67–69; Charles Abrams, Will Interracial Housing Work?, 
NATION, Aug. 2, 1947, at 122–24; Marie Jahoda & Patricia Salter West, Race Relations in 
Public Housing, 7 J. SOC. ISSUES 132, 133–36 (1951); Daniel M. Wilner, Rosabelle Price 
Walkley, & Stuart W. Cook, Residential Proximity and Intergroup Relations in Public 
Housing Projects, 8 J. SOC. ISSUES 45, 45 (1952). 
137 See, e.g.,  LEE NICHOLS, BREAKTHROUGH ON THE COLOR FRONT (1954); 1–2 
SAMUEL STOUFFER ET AL., AMERICAN SOLDIER (1949); PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON 
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 130, at 83–84; WALTER WHITE, A MAN CALLED WHITE 248–52, 
363 (1948); WALTER WHITE, HOW FAR THE PROMISED LAND? 87–103 (1955); Armed 
Forces: Ahead of the Country, TIME, June 5, 1950, at 18; Roy K. Davenport, The Negro in 
the Army: A Subject of Research, 3 J. SOC. ISSUES 32, 35–37 (1947); Ralph Ellison, The 
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Psychology supported the cause of racial liberals with a legalist agenda in 
another way. To believe that laws could serve an educative role, the very concept 
of antiprejudice “education” had to be rethought. Rather than the gradual reshaping 
of Sumnerian folkways favored by the earlier educationist approach, some racial 
liberals advocated a model of reeducation based on the more drastic attitudinal 
reshaping, which modern psychology convinced them was possible.140 Since racial 
liberals, following the lead of the psychologists, saw prejudice as basically 
irrational,141 careful demonstration of the flaws in the bigots’ reasoning would be 
ineffective. Rather, what was needed was a kind of attitudinal shock treatment. As 
the authors of The Authoritarian Personality explained, to deal with prejudiced 
people, one must exploit their tendency toward submissiveness to authority. The 
authoritarian personality type (a category that included southern racists) “would be 
impressed by legal restraints against discrimination, and . . . his self-restraint 
would increase as minority groups became stronger through being protected.”142 
________________________ 
Booker T., NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 18, 1946, at 260, 263; E. W. Kenworthy, The Case Against 
Army Segregation, 275 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 27, 30–31 (1951); Races: 
The Unbunching, TIME, Feb. 22, 1954, at 30; Arnold M. Rose, Army Policies Toward 
Negro Soldiers: A Report on a Success and a Failure, 3 J. SOC. ISSUES 26, 27–28 (1947); 
Malcolm Ross, The Need – and the Chance – for Equality, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, May 
25, 1952, at 9; B.K. Thorne, Mixed Races Train Well in Air Force, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 
1949, at 53; Roy Wilkins, Undergirding the Democratic Ideal, CRISIS, Dec. 1951, at 649. 
138 See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 130, at 84–85; 
MALCOLM ROSS, ALL MANNER OF MEN (1948); LOUIS RUCHAMES, RACE, JOBS, & 
POLITICS: THE STORY OF FEPC 183–88 (1953); SEGREGATION IN WASHINGTON, supra note 
136, at 68–74; SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE 
COMMITTEE, June 28, 1946, in 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE TRUMAN PRESIDENCY 
101–07 (Dennis Merrill, ed., 1996); Ira N. Brophy, The Luxury of Anti-Negro Prejudice, 9 
PUB. OP. Q. 456 (1945–46); John Harding & Russell Hogrefe, Attitudes of White 
Department Store Employees Toward Negro Co-Workers, 8 J. SOC. ISSUES 18, 21–22 
(1952); Ralph D. Minard, Race Relationships in the Pocahontas Coal Field, 8 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 29, 31–34 (1952); Caroline K. Simon, Causes and Cures of Discrimination, N.Y. 
TIMES MAGAZINE, May 29, 1949, at 10, 34–36.  
139 For more general assertions of the possibilities for diminished prejudice that would 
come out of increased interracial contact, see GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF 
PREJUDICE 261–82 (1954); WATSON, supra note 81, at 148–49; Isidor Chein, The Problems 
of Inconsistency: A Restatement, 5 J. SOC. ISSUES 52, 60 (1949); Alfred McClung Lee, A 
Sociological Discussion on Consistency and Inconsistency in Intergroup Relations, 5 J. 
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(“[I]t is not difficult to see why measures to oppose social discrimination have not been 
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142 Id. at 973–74; see also WATSON, supra note 81, at 107 (“[T]he introduction of the 
change as an established, inevitable, taken-for-granted order, with a minimum of 
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With their appreciation for the power of the law, racial liberals reevaluated the 
relationship between segregation policy and race relations. Rather than viewing 
laws as simply reflections of societal attitudes, they could now be seen as 
formative influences on these attitudes. It was clear to racial liberals that 
discrimination, particularly when sanctioned by the state in the form of statutes, 
court decisions, and executive orders, increased prejudice.143 “[I]t is law—
prejudiced, written law—that sets the discriminatory pattern,” wrote the editors of 
the New York Times in explaining their support for civil rights legislation.144 And if 
this was true, so was the converse. Dismissing the “rigid fatalism of William 
Graham Sumner,” Maslow argued that “removing discrimination results as a by-
product in a lessening of prejudice.”145 The report of the President’s Committee on 
Civil Rights—the most influential civil rights policy statement of the early postwar 
years—came to much the same conclusion: “The achievement of full civil rights in 
law may do as much to end prejudice as the end of prejudice may do to achieve 
full civil rights.”146 
 
________________________ 
preliminary debate, seemed to work most effectively.”); Kenneth B. Clark, Desegregation: 
An Appraisal of the Evidence, 9 J. SOC. ISSUES 2, 74–75 (1953). 
143 “Much intolerance and discrimination are today encouraged by the law . . . . Those 
who are opposed to civil rights laws on the ground you cannot legislate morality should 
ponder the possibility that we have been legislating immorality!” Robert K. Carr, To 
Secure These Rights, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 22, 1950, at 11. 
144 Legislating Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1949, at 20. 
145 Will Maslow, Prejudice, Discrimination, and the Law, 275 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 10, 14 (1951); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 85; John H. Burma, Race 
Relations and Antidiscriminatory Legislation, 56 AM. J. SOC. 416, 416–17 (1951); J.D. 
Hyman, Segregation and the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 VAND. L. REV. 555, 572 (1951); 
Wilfred C. Leland, Jr., We Believe in Employment on Merit, But . . ., 37 MINN. L. REV. 
246, 249 (1953).  
146 PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 130, at 134; see also 
Burma, supra note 145; Harold Dublirer, Legislation Outlawing Racial Discrimination in 
Employment, 5 LAWYERS GUILD REV. 101, 107–08 (1945); Shad Polier, Law, Conscience 
and Society, 6 LAWYERS GUILD REV. 490, 491 (1946). 
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D.  Faith Confirmed—Early Civil Rights Reforms 
 
With seductive simplicity, the 1947 report of the President’s Commission on 
Higher Education summarized the basic premise of postwar racial liberalism: 
“Where assurance of good conduct in other fields of public concern has not been 
forthcoming from citizen groups, the passage of laws to enforce good conduct has 
been the corrective method of a democratic society.”147 But translating this 
seemingly common-sense assumption into policy reform, moving from changing 
mainstream discourse about law to changing actual law, proved a monumental 
challenge. 
Civil rights activists faced one of their stiffest challenges in the ultimately 
unsuccessful struggle to pass federal legislation creating a permanent Fair 
Employment Practices Committee (FEPC). The issue was a focal point for legalist 
claims. In a 1948 editorial supporting the passage of an FEPC bill, the Washington 
Post noted that while educational efforts were important, they should not be used 
as a replacement for legal reform: “The example of the Federal Government is a 
potent factor in the educative process.”148 Charles S. Johnson, president of Fisk 
University, himself a committed proponent of educationalist reform measures, 
demonstrated the growing attraction of the legalist position. “At first sight, 
legislative and governmental action may not appear to fall in the category of 
building bridges of understanding,” Johnson explained in 1946.149 “But such action 
is educational in the deepest sense, for it teaches by example rather than precept, 
and it invests that example with the authority of the national will.”150  
Racial liberals also focused on executive action as another area in which to 
examine the efficacy of civil rights law. By far, the most significant presidential 
initiative of the period was Truman’s executive order desegregating the military. It 
caused no major upheavals and was generally considered an important success 
story.151 Many saw the desegregation of the military as reinforcing the “contact 
theory” premise being developed by social psychologists. “[W]here men do live 
and work together regardless of race and religion,” one commentator wrote, 
                                                
147 2 PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, HIGHER EDUCATION FOR 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: EQUALIZING AND EXPANDING INDIVIDUAL OPPORTUNITY 27 
(1947).  
148 Anti-Discrimination Bill, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1948, at 10; see also Brazeal, 
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“prejudice and intolerance begin to decline and awareness of the importance of the 
individual as against his membership in a racial group begins to grow.”152 
The case for law’s capacity received its most thorough evaluation in the area 
of state and local civil rights legislation. Southern members of Congress blocked 
federal civil rights legislation through this period, but in the states and major cities 
outside the Deep South, the decade following World War II saw an explosion of 
antidiscrimination laws.153 In making the case for these laws, civil rights advocates 
regularly drew on their confident claims about the power of civil rights laws to 
change social behavior. More importantly in terms of creating pressure for 
additional federal action, state and local antidiscrimination efforts provided civil 
rights advocates and their allies in the social sciences plentiful evidence to draw 
upon in further advancing their case for the efficacy of civil rights laws. As the 
report of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights explained, a key to civil rights 
progress “is to give the public living examples of civil rights in operation.”154 
Civil rights activity below the federal level has largely been lost to history. In 
light of the subsequent achievements of the civil rights movement, the passage of 
moderate fair employment and public accommodation legislation in northern and 
western states seems unremarkable, even unimportant. They were compromise 
bills, lacking truly effective enforcement mechanisms, often reliant on voluntary 
contributions of affected industries. But, when viewed from the perspective of the 
period in which they were passed, in light of decades of inaction in protecting 
blacks from racial discrimination, they marked the dawn of a new era in civil 
rights: liberal activists celebrated these efforts, studying them and publicizing them 
as models for more ambitious reform policy. In this way, state and local reforms 
proved critical to the development of federal civil rights reform. 
Although these local and state laws had many obvious shortcomings—most 
significantly inadequate enforcement mechanisms—liberal reformers of the day 
considered them largely effective and went out of their way to publicize them as 
models of civil rights reform in action. “The act has worked, and worked 
smoothly,” MacIver concluded about a landmark New York antidiscrimination 
                                                
152 Carr, supra note 143, at 43. 
153 The model for practically all subsequent state-level antidiscrimination law in the 
field of employment was New York’s Ives-Quinn Act of 1945, the first law prohibiting 
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law. “All contrary anticipations have been falsified.”155 Caroline Simon, previously 
a member of the New York State Commission Against Discrimination, wrote in 
1949 that the Commission had “changed the entire pattern of employment of the 
most populous state in the union in less than four years.”156 In the blunt assessment 
of one journalist, “[t]wo years of state FEPC’s have done more to end job 
discrimination than fifty years of private agitation, good-will conferences, [and] 
educational campaigning.”157 
Reformers often used laudatory assessments of state-level initiatives as 
empirical evidence to support similar reform in other states or, more significantly, 
in the federal government. They provided tangible evidence that civil rights laws 
could be effective, even in the face of considerable opposition from public opinion 
and business interests. The state-level reforms were thus important stepping stones 
toward a more comprehensive, far-reaching national racial reform movement. As 
the fight for a permanent federal FEPC was taking place in Congress, Herbert N. 
Northrup, a consultant to the wartime FEPC, drew on the experiences of state 
reform as evidence for his support of the bill.158 “Thus far opponents and sponsors 
of FEPC have fought their battle largely in the realm of speculation,” and the 
federal FEPC could be seen as just a temporary, wartime experiment, he noted.159 
“Now, however, the situation is different. We have had experience.”160 The New 
York experience in particular, Northrup concluded, “has served as a laboratory for 
the whole nation.”161 Northrup was not alone in his use of state and local 
experiments to promote more ambitious efforts. When, in 1949, Attorney General 
J. Howard McGrath sought evidence for his assertion that national civil rights laws 
could contribute to the decline of prejudice, he cited the experiences of state fair 
employment practices legislation as “indicating that this kind of law can create a 
climate of opinion in which discrimination tends to disappear.”162 Similarly, in 
framing an editorial in support of a federal civil rights bill, the New York Times 
began by summarizing accomplishments that had taken place in the states.163  
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The states were working as the social “laboratories” Justice Louis Brandeis 
envisioned in an earlier era.164 They offered, in the words of Caroline Simon, a 
“rough-and-ready laboratory of practical affairs.”165 As racial liberals searched for 
tangible examples to support their assertion that laws could change behavior, that 
racial discrimination was a social problem properly dealt with through government 
action, the reforms taking place throughout much of the nation on the state and 
local level proved to be invaluable resources. 
 
E.  Historians and the Origins of Jim Crow 
 
One of the most prominent efforts to emphasize the importance of the law in 
the area of race relations took place on the battlefield of historical interpretation. 
When, for example, Oscar and Mary Handlin examined the origins of racism and 
slavery in America, they found that the formalization of the institution of slavery 
toward the end of the seventeenth century—manifested through statutes and 
enforcement of contracts—solidified a racial hierarchy that exhibited considerable 
fluidity in previous decades.166 The Handlins’ article directly challenged previous 
accounts of the formation of slavery in early America, which had described slavery 
as a consequence of innate prejudice of whites toward blacks. One scholar 
described the broader implications of their claims: “Late and gradual enslavement 
undercut the possibility of natural, deep-seated antipathy toward Negroes.”167 
Thus, in this interpretation, it was the legalization of slavery that led to racial 
discrimination, rather than, as previous scholars generally argued, preexisting 
racial prejudice and discrimination that led to the development of the institution of 
slavery. The relevance for the postwar civil rights campaign was obvious: “[I]f 
whites and Negroes could share the same status of half freedom for forty years in 
the seventeenth century, why could they not share full freedom in the twentieth?” 
asked historian Winthrop Jordan.168 “Prejudice must have followed enslavement, 
not vice versa, else any liberal program of action would be badly compromised.”169 
While the Handlins’ reading of the history of slavery informed mid-twentieth 
century racial concerns only indirectly, the influence of C. Vann Woodward’s The 
Strange Career of Jim Crow (1955) was direct and immediate. Woodward 
explicitly framed this book—which Martin Luther King Jr. praised as “the 
                                                
164 “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
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historical bible of the civil rights movement”170—not only as a reinterpretation of 
the rise of segregation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, but also as 
a statement about the potential for civil rights reform in postwar America. Strange 
Career grew out of a series of lectures Woodward wrote in the months following 
Brown and presented at the University of Virginia in the fall of 1954 (delivered, as 
Woodward made a point of noting in the preface of the book, to an “unsegregated” 
audience).171 Analogous to the Handlins’ findings, Woodward found a large 
measure of fluidity in the racial hierarchy in the late nineteenth century, prior to 
the imposition of Jim Crow statutes. The title of his second chapter, “Forgotten 
Alternatives,” captured the essence of his thesis.172 Woodward’s message to the 
nation, and particularly to his native South, was that race relations had not always 
been this way, that segregation was a relatively recent construct, and that 
dismantling Jim Crow was therefore more possible than many thought.173 As 
Woodward described in the preface, “Unable to remember a time when segregation 
was not the general rule and practice, [southerners] have naturally assumed that 
things have ‘always been that way.’”174 The historian who more than any other 
gave shape to this view that the situation had “always been that way” was Ulrich 
B. Phillips, who in 1928 famously declared that the central theme of southern 
history was a shared belief among whites in their supremacy over blacks.175 
Woodward directly challenged this point by highlighting an era, not so far gone, 
when white supremacy was not quite so dominant.  
Like the Handlins, the key pieces of evidence for his argument were statutes. 
Woodward explicitly critiqued Sumner’s argument that laws had little effect on 
cultural practices. While conceding that “laws are not an adequate index of the 
extent and prevalence of segregation and discriminatory practices in the South,”176 
he emphasized that laws were essential to the development of segregation. Before 
the imposition of Jim Crow laws in the late nineteenth century, Woodward wrote, 
“the Negro could and did do many things in the South that in the latter part of the 
period, under different conditions, he was prevented from doing.”177 
“[S]egregation statutes, or ‘Jim Crow’ laws . . . constituted the most elaborate and 
formal expression of sovereign white opinion upon the subject”;178 they gave an 
“illusion of permanency.”179 While recognizing “evidence that segregation and 
discrimination became generally practiced before they became law,” Woodward 
emphasized “that segregation and ostracism were not nearly so harsh and rigid in 
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the early years as they became later”—that is, after the legalization of Jim Crow.180 
Prior to this point, “it was not yet an accepted corollary that the subordinates had to 
be totally segregated and needlessly humiliated by a thousand daily reminders of 
their subordination.”181 In sum: “The policies of proscription, segregation, and 
disfranchisement that are often described as the immutable ‘folkways’ of the 
South, impervious alike to legislative reform and armed intervention, are of a more 
recent origin . . . . [T]he belief that they are immutable and unchangeable is not 
supported by history.”182 
Woodward, a southerner who was an outspoken critic of segregation, did not 
hide the present-day concerns that he sought to address.  
 
The national discussion over the questions of how deeply rooted, how 
ineradicable, and how amenable to change the segregation practices 
really are is being conducted against a background of faulty or 
inadequate historical information. And some of the most widely held 
sociological theories regarding segregation are based upon erroneous 
history.183  
 
That this careful and respected historian would concern himself so directly in the 
ongoing debate over legal change and segregation was in large part a product of his 
recent involvement with the NAACP’s legal campaign against school segregation. 
Woodward, like his friend and fellow historian John Hope Franklin, had aided 
Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP lawyers in their historical research.184 
Looking back on his work, after over a decade of controversy over his thesis 
regarding the late onset of rigidity in Jim Crow race relations, Woodward would 
recognize the pressures his civil rights sympathies placed upon his scholarship.  
 
If the thesis were sound, then the traditional defenses of segregation were 
breached and weakened because they pictured the system as entrenched 
in immemorial and unbroken usage and quite beyond the reach of legal 
action. And again, if the system were of relatively recent origin and was 
itself the result of political and legal action, then reformers might take 
hope that segregation was not all that invulnerable and that the law might 
be used effectively to bring about change.185 
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2008] LAW’S CAPACITY & BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 1525 
 
The general belief that law was the key to understanding the development of 
Jim Crow was prevalent during the early postwar period—Woodward’s work was 
simply the most widely identified with this argument. For example, in 1950, law 
professor Thomas Emerson, in arguing for Supreme Court leadership in ridding the 
nation of racial segregation, argued that if the Court had struck down the 
segregation law in Plessy, it could “have exercised its judicial powers and prestige 
to nip segregation in the bud, at a time when the break with slavery was fresh. 
Unfortunately, it did not choose to do so.”186 Political scientist Alan Westin wrote 
a profile of Justice John Marshal Harlan, whose famous dissent in Plessy took on a 
prophetic quality in the postwar period, in which he attributed Harlan’s great 
midlife transformation on the race question (he had been a slaveholder before the 
Civil War) to the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments—simply put, the 
force of the legal transformation led to a personal transformation.187 For Westin, 
writing in 1957, three years after Brown, the implications for the present were 
clear: “Now, like Harlan, these men [i.e., white southerners] have been carried 
across the barrier by the change in fundamental law which the Segregation Cases 
decreed, and a new range of possibilities has opened to them.”188  
The lessons of history had long been the proud terrain of Jim Crow’s 
defenders, who argued that white supremacy, in belief and practice, was an 
unchanging heritage of southern life. These lessons were now being challenged. 
Civil rights advocates found history to be valuable ground through which they 
could demonstrate that prejudice was not permanently embedded in southern 
society, and, more consequentially for postwar civil rights, that laws had been 
particularly effective at shaping personal beliefs, and thereby remaking race 
relations. 
 
IV.  THE TRIUMPH OF FAITH IN THE LAW: THE ROAD TO BROWN 
 
The old alibi that you have to educate the people first and do the 
right thing afterward has now been exploded by the Supreme Court. 189 
 
The claim that law was uniquely suited to addressing America’s racial 
dilemma received extensive support in the debate over school segregation that 
culminated in Brown. When, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, school 
desegregation litigation emerged as the next major civil rights battleground, 
opponents regularly conceded that civil rights legislation might be appropriate. If a 
state wanted to desegregate its schools, critics allowed, it certainly could do so. 
And perhaps Congress could pass a federal law desegregating schools. But they 
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drew the line when civil rights advocates argued that school segregation was 
wrong not just as a policy matter, but as a constitutional matter—and therefore the 
issue was one for the federal courts. Critics of judicial leadership in dismantling 
Jim Crow drew on several principles. They argued that such a social 
transformation was a political issue, and it was a violation of democratic principles 
for unelected judges to initiate such a monumental social upheaval.190 They also 
argued the legal merits of the constitutional claim, noting that the history behind 
the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment gave little indication that it was 
intended to prohibit segregated schools,191 and further, there was too much 
precedent for the Court to change course at this point.192 These critics also had a 
final, powerful argument in their arsenal—an argument historians of Brown have 
largely overlooked: they were deeply skeptical of the capacity of the law to 
dismantle Jim Crow.  
Those opposing judicial intervention argued that a legal pronouncement, even 
by an institution as esteemed as the highest court of the land, without sufficient 
support on the ground, would be ineffective, perhaps even counterproductive. Here 
was a test of the capacity of the law in its barest form: could the mere words of the 
Supreme Court—which was, after all, the “least dangerous branch,” in Alexander 
Hamilton’s famous estimation, having “neither Force nor Will, but merely 
judgment”193—lead to the abandonment of segregated schools, the centerpiece of 
modern Jim Crow? By the early 1950s, with the Supreme Court sending 
unmistakably promising signals that the Justices were willing to confront this 
issue, racial liberals would focus their energies on this crucial question with 
renewed intensity. The NAACP lawyers who pressed the school desegregation 
cases drew extensively upon the scholarship and claims of racial legalism. And the 
Justices of the Supreme Court would show considerable sympathy toward the 
legalist claims. Although the Justices never embraced the high optimism toward 
the capacity of the law of committed postwar racial liberals, these arguments 
influenced the Court, helping to quell the Justices’ fears that the judiciary lacked 
the power to press the desegregation project forward into this potentially explosive 
area.  
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A.  The Skeptics’ Case 
 
Those who continued to voice resistance toward civil rights reform generally 
based their position on a combination of pessimism toward the state of race 
relations and skepticism toward the capacity of the law, particularly when new 
legal requirements derive from the judicial (as opposed to the legislative) process. 
While the harsh, dismissive pessimism of the early Jim Crow era had dissipated, 
echoes of Plessy and Sumner would still be heard in the postwar period.  
A representative summary of the skeptics’ position can be found in a 1950 
opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
evaluating a challenge to federal segregation law applying to the District of 
Columbia.194 The court framed the legal question as “whether the Constitution 
lifted this problem [i.e., segregation] out of the hands of all legislatures and settled 
it,” to which it concluded that the Constitution did not.195 To support this 
conclusion, the opinion shifted from constitutional analysis to an evaluation of the 
sociology of race relations and the power of legal change.  
 
Since the beginning of human history, no circumstance has given rise to 
more difficult and delicate problems than has the coexistence of different 
races in the same area. Centuries of bitter experience in all parts of the 
world have proved that the problem is insoluble by force of any sort. The 
same history shows that it is soluble by the patient processes of 
community experience.196  
 
Thus, civil rights reform, when not produced by majoritarian processes, is nothing 
more than “force” (equating federal law with “force” was a standard move of the 
skeptics), which, following the folkways assumptions, cannot change social 
practices that are built upon attitudes; this was a job for education, for “the patient 
processes of community experience.” Although this reasoning appears at least 
sympathetic to the Sumnerian skepticism toward all legal reform that runs against 
folkways, the court added that its argument was against judicial intervention, not 
against law per se. “Such problems lie naturally in the field of legislation, a method 
susceptible of experimentation, of development, of adjustment to the current 
necessities in a variety of community circumstance.”197 This was the folkways 
school in its modern form. It attempted to steer the debate over the capacity of the 
law into an institutional competency discussion. Thus, the crucial question for the 
postwar struggle over the capacity of the law would largely revolve around a 
debate over the capacity of the courts. 
The fact that the debate was about schools also gave ammunition to these 
latter-day Sumnerians. Skeptics regularly stressed the special place of education in 
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the social system as a justification for giving latitude to states to allow school 
assignment policy to reflect local customs. Compulsory school laws, “provide[] 
that the school shall supplement the work of the parent in the training of the child 
and in doing so it is entering a delicate field and one fraught with tensions and 
difficulties,” explained a 1951 federal district court opinion that rejected a 
constitutional challenge to segregated schools in South Carolina.198  
 
[T]he law must take account, not merely of the matter of affording 
instruction to the student, but also of the wishes of the parent as to the 
upbringing of the child and his associates in the formative period of 
childhood and adolescence. If public education is to have the support of 
the people through their legislatures, it must not go contrary to what they 
deem for the best interests of their children.199  
 
This approach to education echoed the late-nineteenth-century belief that schools 
belonged to a “social” (as opposed to “civil” or “political”) sphere, into which 
federal constitutional norms should not enter.200 
The Supreme Court was given ample opportunity to weigh the claims of the 
skeptics, for this was a central element of the arguments the states offered in 
defending their segregation statutes in Brown. During oral argument John W. 
Davis, attorney for South Carolina, emphasized the importance of allowing school 
practices to reflect social customs.  
 
Is it not of all the activities of government the one which most nearly 
approaches the hearts and minds of people, the question of education of 
their young?  
Is it not the height of wisdom that the manner in which that shall be 
conducted should be left to those most immediately affected by it, and 
that the wishes of the parents, both white and colored, should be 
                                                
198 Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 535 (D.C.S.C. 1951). 
199 Id. 
200 See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896) (“The object of the 
[fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races 
before the law, but, in the nature of things, it could not have been intended to abolish 
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, 
or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, 
and even requiring, their separation, in places where they are liable to be brought into 
contact, do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been 
generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures 
in the exercise of their police power. The most common instance of this is connected with 
the establishment of separate schools for white and colored children, which has been held 
to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of States where the political 
rights of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced.”). 
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ascertained before their children are forced into what may be an 
unwelcome contact?201  
 
Similarly, the Virginia Attorney General laid out his vision of the negative impact 
a desegregation ruling would have, in language echoing Sumnerian folkways 
principles. Such a decision would be “contrary to the customs, the traditions and 
the mores of what we might claim to be a great people, established through 
generations, who themselves are fiercely and irrevocably dedicated to the 
preservation of the white and colored races.”202 
The claims of the legal skeptics were also the concerns of the Supreme Court 
Justices. As they considered whether to take the momentous step of striking down 
segregated education as in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the last thing 
the Justices wanted to do was to issue a decision that was ignored. They feared 
what Holmes had warned against in Giles—a decision that proved no more than an 
“empty form.”203 “[N]othing would be worse, from my point of view,” warned 
Justice Frankfurter during oral arguments in Brown, “than for this Court to make 
an abstract declaration that segregation is bad and then have it evaded by tricks.”204 
Or, an even worse outcome would be to issue a decision that ignited the South. 
“[I]t is generally recognized,” observed a 1952 law review note, “that the Court 
avoids a per se ruling because it is reluctant to cause social revolution by judicial 
fiat.”205 The Justices of the Court were paying careful attention to developments in 
race relations and the achievements of civil rights campaigns, and they were all 
impressed at the progress that was being made.206 If they were to strike down 
segregated schools, they would have to believe that the decision would contribute 
to this already well-developed trend away from Jim Crow. 
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B.  The Racial Liberals’ Case 
 
As the NAACP lawyers prepared their legal challenge to school segregation, 
they found much support for their positions, particularly their optimistic 
assessments of the potential for federal civil rights reform, in recent legal and 
social scientific scholarship. The civil rights lawyers highlighted studies that 
emphasized that a Supreme Court desegregation ruling would not be particularly 
explosive in the South. Because of social and cultural changes already under way 
(encouraged by previous civil rights reforms), combined with a belief that top-
down legal commands could be effective in the area of race relations, racial 
liberals had high hopes for the effects of a revision of formal federal law. They 
believed the Supreme Court could provide the critical intervention that would 
allow the nation to finally abandon Jim Crow policy, practices, and beliefs. 
The case for the capacity of the law in the context of school desegregation 
was built upon at least a decade of civil rights accomplishments. These included 
the Supreme Court decision in the white primary case of 1944,207 the desegregation 
of the military by executive order in 1948,208 and the 1950 Supreme Court 
decisions holding that the separate-but-equal principle established in Plessy no 
longer satisfied the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment when applied to 
university education.209 Each of these civil rights milestones offered a new 
opportunity to restate the case for the law in the battle for racial equality. For 
example, William H. Hastie wrote an article evaluating the white primary decision 
in which he noted: “For the student of statecraft Smith v. Allwright provides 
occasion for fresh discussion of the wisdom and efficacy of judicial decisions 
which impose sanctions contrary to what seems to be the immediate will and desire 
of large segments of the population.”210 Although the decision was greeted with 
defiance and ominous warnings by segregationists, “[n]ow, a year later, after the 
hue and cry have subsided, it is noteworthy that only South Carolina has been 
moved to undertake legislative nullification of the judicial mandate.”211 Hastie 
continued,  
 
it now can be stated with confidence that the declaration of the law in 
Smith v. Allwright is in fact serving to stimulate public acceptance of the 
Negro as a voter. Prejudice against permitting the Negro to vote is 
proving not to be so deep seated and widespread as to cause, on any 
dangerous or alarming scale, more than a vocal challenge to the authority 
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of the national government. To put the matter somewhat differently, the 
nation is strong enough and its people are sufficiently civilized so that 
such pronouncement by our highest Court can and does serve as a 
catalyst of supporting sentiment rather than an incitation to rebellion.212  
 
Similar assessments emerged in the wake of Truman’s military desegregation order 
and the higher education rulings. In 1949, sociologist Arnold M. Rose (who had 
worked closely with Gunnar Myrdal in the preparation of An American Dilemma) 
published an article in Common Ground, titled “‘You Can’t Legislate Against 
Prejudice’—Or Can You?” in which he summarized what appeared to be an 
emerging scholarly consensus: “A significant amount of evidence has become 
available to indicate that the attitude of prejudice, or at least the practice of 
discrimination, can be substantially reduced by authoritative order.”213 
By the early 1950s, when the NAACP brought their challenge to grade school 
segregation to the Supreme Court, racial liberal ideology pervaded scholarly and 
popular literature. In 1952, for instance, the Yale Law Journal published a student 
note that concluded: “An examination of the available evidence makes it doubtful 
that major violence would accompany educational desegregation.”214 Peaceful 
desegregation was already taking place, much of it by legal compulsion. As 
support, the Note looked to judicially led efforts to end white primaries and 
segregation in higher education:  
 
These instances of southern adjustment to enforced desegregation 
strongly suggest that the normal reaction of the South to Supreme Court 
decisions is not violence. Generally, the only resistance takes the form of 
attempted circumvention. Tighter decrees and persistent enforcement 
ultimately overcome even this type of resistance. Thus there is little 
reason for the courts to allow threats of violence and civil strife to delay 
desegregation.215  
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This note was carefully read by many involved in Brown litigation; it was cited in 
an NAACP brief and in an influential bench memo by one of Chief Justice 
Warren’s clerks.216 
As soon as the school segregation cases began to reach the Supreme Court in 
1951, leading civil rights activists sought to assure anyone who would listen that a 
desegregation order would not lead to major disturbances, and that the entire 
process, following the path set by military and higher education integration, would 
be smoother than expected. Racial segregation in southern schools was already 
“fading away,” observed Clarence Mitchell, the head of the Washington, D.C., 
branch of the NAACP.217 When asked for his prediction of the impact of a 
Supreme Court school desegregation ruling, Mitchell replied:  
 
The whole thing would go well. There would be no problem. I get 
around quite a lot in the Southern communities. The South more and 
more is getting into a mental state where it knows that segregation must 
go in almost everything. With this attitude, segregation sort of fades 
away.218  
 
The NAACP journal the Crisis dismissed predictions of violence in reaction to 
Court-ordered desegregation, citing as evidence the success of the higher education 
cases and the “high respect” of the American people for the Supreme Court.219 In 
early 1954, as the Court deliberated on Brown, Thurgood Marshall stated that a 
favorable Court ruling would mean most schools could be integrated in four or five 
years (although he added, in a rare and surprising display of pessimism probably 
intended to assuage lingering fears of upheavals, that in isolated sections of the 
Deep South such a ruling “would have no effect for thirty years”).220 The New York 
________________________ 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (“Desegregation will be easier than we think 
because it has been in process fifteen years or more and no calamity has fallen upon the 
South . . . . If the United States Supreme Court rules against segregation in the public 
schools, I believe the southern people will meet the challenge with dignity, poise, and 
calm.”).  
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UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 55 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 
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and 10, 1953 Term, at 12, Earl Warren Papers, Container 574, Manuscripts Division, 
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Times reported Marshall’s comments under the headline: “‘Upheaval’ Doubted If 
School Bias Ended.”221 
The claims of the racial liberals steadily seeped into mainstream discussions 
on the fate of Jim Crow. “Segregation has been legally disintegrating under one 
court decision after another,” observed a 1953 New York Times editorial.222 
Impressive strides were being made within higher education, and “the legal issue 
has descended to the public schools by a logical sequence of events.”223 There 
were “risks” involved when a change in law is placed in opposition to “mores and 
social practices . . . [y]et change in race relations in the South . . . has been swift in 
recent years.”224 The editorial concluded:  
 
The Supreme Court will render its decision on segregation in the 
public schools in a climate of growing tolerance that is one of the most 
heartening signs of our times. The climate suggests that, whatever the 
decision of the court may be, democracy has nothing to fear from more 
democracy.225  
 
This editorial is particularly notable because it marked a transformation of the 
position of the Times editorial board. The Times had given a far more measured 
reaction to the 1950 decisions desegregating higher education, praising the Court 
for not moving too quickly: “[A]s long as considerable numbers of people, 
including the majority of dominant elements in whole communities, think 
differently, we cannot expect the millennium. The situation calls for a period of 
education—how long a period no one can say.”226 In just three years, the 
newspaper had gone from opposing a school desegregation decision in favor of “a 
period of education” to accepting, even inviting such a decision.  
The NAACP lawyers recognized the potential for their cause in extrapolating 
examples of civil rights success stories to the issue of grade school segregation. 
When they argued their case before the Court, the civil rights lawyers had to do 
more than just present a convincing interpretation of the Constitution that would 
support their position. And they had to do more than just convince the Justices of 
the wrongness of segregation. They also had to paint a picture of what the country 
would look like after Plessy was overturned. And their picture was relentlessly 
sanguine.  
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The social scientific studies referenced in the NAACP briefs included not just 
references to the damage segregation inflicted on black children (the material that 
eventually found its way into the famous eleventh footnote of the Brown opinion), 
but also to the malleability of prejudices in the face of outside stimulus.227 
Attached to one NAACP brief was an appendix entitled, “The Effects of 
Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation: A Social Science 
Statement.”228 In summarizing the anticipated consequences of a desegregation 
order, the statement echoed the characteristic optimism of racial liberals: 
“desegregation has been carried out successfully in a variety of situations although 
outbreaks of violence had been commonly predicted.”229 It specifically noted 
successes with desegregation in the military, housing, and industry and referenced 
the latest studies supporting the racial liberal adherence to racial contact theory.230 
In 1953 the Journal of Social Issues dedicated an entire issue to a presentation of 
research that social psychologist Kenneth Clark compiled during his work with the 
NAACP lawyers in the segregation cases.231 The focus of this article was not on 
his research demonstrating the damages of segregation (Clark’s famous doll 
studies232), but on his work evaluating the potential impact of a school 
desegregation order. Clark argued that although experience had demonstrated that 
there were necessary preconditions to successful integration—including, most 
notably, strong leadership—wide-scale mandatory integration was feasible. He 
concluded, “when desegregation takes place it is generally evaluated, even by 
those who [were ] initially skeptical, as successful and is seen as increasing rather 
than decreasing social stability.”233 
The points Thurgood Marshall made during the first round of oral arguments 
in Brown also emphasized a faith in the capacity of the law.234 Marshall pointed to 
previous judicial interventions on matters of civil rights, specifically the white 
primary and higher education decisions, as evidence of the power of the Court:  
 
[T]he record shows . . . that all of these predictions of things that were 
going to happen [riots, organized resistance, etc.], they have never 
happened. And I for one do not believe that the people in South Carolina 
or those southern states are lawless people.  
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Every single time that this Court has ruled, they [i.e., white 
southerners] have obeyed it, and I for one believe that rank and file 
people in the South will support whatever decision in this case is handed 
down. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . [P]eople have grown up and understand each other. They are 
fighting together and living together.235 
 
 
Marshall explained that he did “not think that segregation in public schools is 
any more ingrained in the South than segregation in transportation,”236 an area in 
which the Court had already made significant desegregation rulings.237 The real 
problem of segregation, he contended, was “the state-imposed part of it”238—that 
is, the segregation laws were the fundamental problem, more than the fact of 
segregation itself. And in a dramatic exchange with Justice Reed, who wondered if 
segregation might be justified as a way to maintain order,239 Marshall left the Court 
with this hopeful image:  
 
I know in the South where I spent most of my time, you will see white 
and colored kids going down the road together to school. They separate 
and go to different schools, and they come out and they play together. I 
do not see why there would necessarily be any trouble if they went to 
school together.240 
 
C.  The Brown Court 
 
Each Justice came to support the desegregation decision through his own path 
of reasoning and conscience. But certain common themes emerged from the 
Justices’ deliberation process. All nine men were clearly aware of the changes in 
social attitudes and scientific findings on race. This was particularly true of those 
Justices who struggled most with the decision. Considering the strong 
integrationist tenor of most of these scholarly works, such study undoubtedly 
exerted pressure to support desegregation. With some exceptions, the Justices of 
the Supreme Court accepted the basic premises of the racial liberal argument: that 
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racial attitudes were not set in stone and that they had shown significant 
improvement in recent years; and that civil rights laws could be effective even in 
the face of initial popular resistance. 
On matters of civil rights, the Justices were constantly looking to social 
developments beyond the Court. Felix Frankfurter and Stanley Reed carefully 
assembled extensive files of material on segregation and civil rights reform, 
pouring over the latest developments and findings. Law professor Herbert 
Wechsler captured this interest in a scene he described about visiting Justice Reed 
in his office while the Justices were deliberating on the segregation cases. “There 
he was sitting behind a big desk . . . and all over were spread magazines and 
journals of psychiatry and psychology,” Wechsler recalled. “He looked a little 
weary, and he pointed to the whole batch and asked, ‘You know anything about 
discrimination?’”241 
Of course, simply engaging with recent liberal scholarship was different from 
embracing its claims. Not all were convinced. Of all the Justices on the Brown 
Court, Robert Jackson was probably the most antagonistic toward basic racial 
liberal assumptions. “You can’t cure this situation by putting children together,”242 
he told his colleagues in the conference following the first round of oral arguments 
in the school segregation cases, thereby caricaturing and dismissing a central claim 
of racial contact theory. In his unpublished concurring opinion in Brown, Jackson 
wrote that courts “cannot eradicate” the “fears, prides and prejudices” that support 
segregation.243  
 
This Court, in common with courts everywhere, has recognized the force 
of long custom and has been reluctant to use judicial power to try to 
recast social usages established among the people. . . . Today’s decision 
is to uproot a custom deeply embedded not only in state statutes but in 
the habit and usage of people in their local communities.244  
 
From this he concluded, “in embarking upon a widespread reform of social 
customs and habits of countless communities, we must face the limitations on 
the nature and effectiveness of the judicial process.”245 
Jackson also drew attention to an irony inherent in the reasoning behind the 
legal attack on segregation. Racial liberals criticized Plessy for its faulty reasoning 
that laws were powerless to change social habits. Yet a strong argument could be 
made that the failure of Plessy was actually a product of the basic correctness of 
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this proposition. The legal requirement in the 1896 ruling was that segregated 
facilities were constitutionally acceptable as long as they were equal, yet this 
requirement, announced from the apex of the American legal system, was 
systematically ignored. Law had failed—and failed miserably—to do what racial 
liberals insisted it had the power to do. Jackson highlighted this fact in his 
concurrence: “I see no reason to expect a pronouncement that segregation is 
unconstitutional will be any more self-executing or any more efficiently executed 
than our pronouncement that unequal facilities are unconstitutional.”246 This 
inconvenient fact received only occasional mention among supporters of 
desegregation.247  
Hugo Black also expressed reservations about the legalist assumptions that 
dominated discussions of civil rights reform. While committed to overruling 
Plessy, he also played the role of the Court’s Cassandra. During the Justices’ 
conferences, the Alabama Justice frequently aired his skepticism regarding 
compliance in the South to a federal court order. He even predicted that violence 
would result from a desegregation order. In 1950, when there was some discussion 
among the Justices regarding the difficulties of issuing a desegregation order that 
applied to higher education but not public schools, Black told his colleagues, “At 
this time, it might make trouble in the South in the lower schools. Schools would 
close rather than mix races at the grade and high school levels.”248 Even a move 
against segregation in higher education might result in “clashes.”249 In 1952, when 
the Justices first squarely faced school desegregation, his predictions were even 
more dire. “[T]here may be violence if [the] Court holds segregation unlawful . . . . 
[S]tates would probably take evasive measures while purporting to obey.”250 Of all 
the Justices, Black was probably the least aware of, or the least interested in, the 
ongoing debate over the capacity of the law to change race relations. 
Yet Black’s influence on his fellow Justices was limited. As the only voice of 
the Deep South, the Justices obviously listened to his predictions with particular 
interest. But the fact that few of the Justices echoed Black’s estimation of the 
likely results of a ruling (and at least one openly took issue with Black’s 
predictions), indicates that they had other, more influential voices sending quite 
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different signals. Jackson, who expressed such skepticism toward the tenets of 
racial legalism, was generally optimistic that civil rights progress was taking place 
and would continue to take place. The Supreme Court, he assumed, would 
eventually have to follow that trend.251 Even Reed, the last holdout in Brown, 
recognized the clear direction of change on civil rights. In 1949 Reed wrote a 
personal memorandum in which he noted (with some resignation): “It may be that 
segregation is not a lasting condition. It may be an exception of the moment in the 
movement toward abolition of all distinctions of people by law.”252 During the 
Court’s deliberation on Brown, he had his clerks researching the latest trends in 
civil rights policy.253 In oral arguments, after listening to Marshall’s optimistic 
assessment of southern race relations and prediction for a smooth transition to 
integration, Reed responded, “I am not thinking of trouble.”254 His concern was 
whether the federal courts should be getting involved in this issue.255 
Despite Black’s relentless pessimism, and Jackson’s quieter skepticism, the 
dominant attitude among the Justices confronting school desegregation was one of 
hopefulness. The efforts of racial liberals to redefine the grounds on which racial 
reform was discussed, to inject confidence into the campaign for federal civil 
rights policies, and to move the powerful liberal establishment toward the tenets of 
racial liberalism was, by the early 1950s, largely successful. The Brown ruling 
emerged from this atmosphere of optimism. With the exception of Black, the 
Justices underestimated the potential for organized resistance to their 
desegregation order. “The Court expected some resistance from the South,” 
Warren later wrote in his memoirs. “But I doubt if any of us expected as much as 
we got.”256 Justice Burton noted: “There is a trend away from separation of the 
races in restaurants, the armed forces, and so forth.”257 He also saw a clear line of 
progression from the higher education decisions to Brown.258 In a direct counter to 
Black’s insistence on the problems that a desegregation decision would create in 
the South, Justice Minton asserted: “There may be trouble in the offing, but I doubt 
it.”259 He supported this assessment by pointing to the successful integration of the 
military.260 He also drew on his own experience in Indiana, where, in his 
estimation, “segregation is on its way out.”261 
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By far, the most persistent proponent of racial liberal optimism on the Court 
was Frankfurter. Frankfurter was in the midst of his own battle between his 
commitment to the doctrine of judicial restraint (which led him to consider school 
desegregation an issue better left to legislatures) and his lifelong opposition to 
racial discrimination and segregation. If Frankfurter were to abandon judicial 
restraint in this particular case, it would be the product of not only his belief in the 
wrongness of segregation, but also his assessment of the readiness of American 
society to accept a judicial desegregation ruling. His central concern was to protect 
the Court, which he saw as an inherently fragile institution whose authority was 
largely dependent on its prestige in the national consciousness, from becoming 
politicized and, as a result, weakened. According to Philip Elman, one of the 
Justice’s close correspondents during this period, Frankfurter “was waiting for 
public opinion to form; he was waiting for the effects of the Court’s decisions in 
Henderson, Sweatt, and McLaurin to be felt; he was waiting for some movement 
outside the court system toward racial integration.”262  
To measure the public mood, Frankfurter had his clerks track down 
information on the latest developments of various integration efforts, and the 
reports he received indicated that the integration process was going smoothly.263 
Extrapolating from integration success stories in the border states, Frankfurter 
convinced himself that the South was also moving in a promising direction. He 
prided himself on his contacts with lawyers in the South (most of whom were 
former students of his), and the impression that Frankfurter gained from these 
contacts was that the South was prepared to accept a Supreme Court desegregation 
ruling.264 
When Warren arrived, Frankfurter immediately pressed his optimistic 
assessment of the changing dynamics of race relations on the new Chief Justice. 
Frankfurter would prove a particularly influential voice for Warren as he 
approached the task of writing the Brown opinion. In a memorandum written in the 
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summer of 1952 and passed on to Warren when he arrived on the Court, 
Frankfurter noted: “The policy of segregation has in the short period of thirty years 
undergone great modification. . . . [I]t is fair to say that the pace of progress has 
surprised even those most eager in its promotion.”265 This fact was central to 
Frankfurter’s reasoning in the case:  
 
The legal problem confronting this Court is the extent to which this 
desirable and even necessary process of welding a nation out of such 
diverse elements can be imposed as a matter of law upon the States in 
disregard of the deeply rooted feeling and tradition, based upon local 
situations, to the contrary.266  
 
This hurdle could be overcome through either a reevaluation of the role of the 
Court (of the capacity of the law, essentially) or a reevaluation of the extent of 
opposition to the proposed Court ruling—or some combination of the two, toward 
which Frankfurter was working. Not only was the practice of segregation changing 
but also the beliefs that accompanied this arrangement. “Law must respond to 
transformation of views as well as to that of outward circumstances. The effect of 
changes in men’s feelings for what is right and just is equally relevant in 
determining whether differentiation of treatment by law is a denial of ‘the equal 
protection of the laws.’”267 In the months leading up the ruling, Frankfurter gave an 
article to Warren that had recently been published in the Washington Post. The 
article, titled “Virginia Has Lost Alarm at Racial Ruling,” explained that a school 
desegregation decision “is awaited in Virginia with grave anxiety, but without 
anything resembling hysteria.”268 Warren returned the article with a note, dated 
May 4, 1954, that read: “Felix: This is a splendid and encouraging article. I 
enjoyed our discussion yesterday. It was extremely helpful to me.”269 
Warren’s political background predisposed him to share Frankfurter’s 
optimism toward the trend of American race relations. He came to the Court after 
serving a decade as a popular governor of California, and he brought with him an 
understanding of how the previous decade had transformed race relations as a 
matter of politics and public policy. His background in California politics gave him 
a sense of optimism about the progress of race relations. Following a federal 
appeals court decision striking down a California school district’s policy of 
separately educating children of Mexican descent,270 the California legislature 
                                                
265 Memorandum from Justice Felix Frankfurter 2 (Sept. 26, 1952), Earl Warren 
Papers, Container 571, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.  
266 Id.  
267 Id. Benjamin Muse, Virginia Has Lost Alarm at Racial Ruling, WASH. POST, Apr. 
25, 1954 at 1. 
268 Id. 
269 Letter from Justice Earl Warren to Justice Felix Frankfurter (May 4, 1954), Felix 
Frankfurter Papers, Part 2, Reel 4, Frame 9, Modern Manuscripts Collections, Harvard Law 
School, Cambridge, Mass.   
270 Westminster School Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774, 781 (9th Cir. 1947) (en banc). 
2008] LAW’S CAPACITY & BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 1541 
 
passed, and Governor Warren signed, a bill prohibiting school segregation in the 
state.271 Thus, with judicial prodding and strikingly little fanfare or controversy, 
California discarded legal segregation in its schools. California saw another major 
civil rights ruling when, in 1948, the California Supreme Court ventured into a 
field that the U.S. Supreme Court would not hazard until the late 1960s and ruled 
unconstitutional the state’s miscegenation statute—the first time that any court, 
state or federal, had done so.272 By the time Warren left California, he had already 
taken part in a civil rights project that was not overly controversial within his home 
state, and whose successes, he felt, had resulted from a combination of leadership, 
political skill, and moderation.273 
Warren’s Brown opinion included a reference to the importance of law in 
creating the harmful environment the Court was striking down as unconstitutional. 
Warren quoted from the finding of fact of the district court decision in Brown,274 
which had concluded that the damages segregation inflicted on black children “is 
greater when it has the sanction of the law.”275 This lower court finding, in turn, 
had apparently drawn on expert testimony of psychologist Louisa Pinkham Holt, 
who had explained:  
 
The fact that it is enforced, that it is legal, I think, has more importance 
than the mere fact of segregation by itself does because this gives legal 
and official sanction to a policy which is inevitably interpreted both by 
white people and by Negroes as denoting the inferiority of the Negro 
group.276 
                                                
271 CHARLES WOLLENBERG, ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: SEGREGATION AND EXCLUSION 
IN CALIFORNIA SCHOOLS, 1855–1975, at 132 (1976). 
272 Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 29 (Cal. 1948). 
273 See generally Schmidt, supra note 216, at 378–439. 
274 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951). 
275 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
276 KLUGER, supra note 16, at 421; see also I.A. NEWBY, CHALLENGE TO THE COURT: 
SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND THE DEFENSE OF SEGREGATION, 1954–1966, at 33–34 (rev. ed., 
1969) (discussing scholarship on the effects of segregation on young children); John P. 
Jackson, The Triumph of the Segregationists? A Historiographical Inquiry Into Psychology 
and the Brown Litigation, 3 HIST. PSYCH. 239, 254–56 (2000) (discussing studies of the 
psychological damage from legally imposed segregation). 
The NAACP brief in Brown quoted from the lower court findings and added:  
 
The testimony [on which the court based its finding] further developed the fact 
that the enforcement of segregation under law denies to the Negro status, power 
and privilege. . . ; interferes with his motivation for learning . . . ; and instills in 
him a feeling of inferiority . . . resulting in a personal insecurity, confusion and 
frustration that condemns him to an ineffective role as a citizen and member of 
society. . . . Moreover, it was demonstrated that racial segregation is supported 
by the myth of the Negro’s inferiority . . . , and where, as here, the state enforces 
segregation, the community at large is supported in or converted to the belief 
that this myth has substance in fact.  
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The Court’s approach to drafting the desegregation opinions reflected an 
underlying confidence in the efficacy of legal rules, even in the volatile area of 
southern race relations. Justice Clark, who tended to echo Black’s dire warnings of 
what a desegregation decision would do to the South, noted that “[t]here is a 
danger of violence if this is not well handled.”277 This was a warning that the 
implementation should be done carefully, a point on which all the Justices were in 
agreement. But this concession, even as limited as it was, was significant. The fact 
that most of the Justices thought that a properly worded, preferably unanimous 
opinion could be effective, that it could follow in the footsteps of the white 
primary and higher education decisions, was a critical step in the creation of 
Brown. “Whether one approves or disapproves” of the segregation decisions, noted 
two social scientists in 1955, “it is clear that the court has undertaken a 
monumental project in the field of social engineering, and one obviously based on 
the assumption that morality can be legislated.”278 Brown reflected a sea change in 
assumptions within mainstream policy discourse toward the prospects of civil 
rights laws to change social practices and attitudes—a transformation that was the 
culmination of at least a decade of efforts by proponents of racial liberal ideology. 
 
D.  The Implementation Decision 
 
Initially at least, developments on the ground following the 1954 
desegregation decision did little to disabuse the Justices or the civil rights lawyers 
and their supporters of their optimistic assessment of the prospects for 
desegregation. Contrary to the predictions of many segregationists, Brown did not 
spark an immediate backlash. In fact, initial reactions to the ruling were generally 
promising. The day after Brown, the New York Times reported that “[l]eading 
American educators . . . . did not believe there would be great difficulty in putting 
________________________ 
 
Brief for Appellants at 9, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Appendix 
to Appellants Briefs at 9, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (“[S]egregation 
gives official recognition and sanction to these other factors of the social complex, and 
thereby enhances the effects of the latter in created the awareness of social status 
differences and feelings of inferiority. The child who, for example, is compelled to attend a 
segregated school may be able to cope with ordinary expressions of prejudice by regarding 
the prejudiced person as evil or misguided; but he cannot readily cope with symbols of 
authority, the full force of the authority of the State—the school or the school board, in this 
instance—in the same manner. Given both the ordinary expression of prejudice and the 
school's policy of segregation, the former takes on greater force and seemingly becomes an 
official expression of the latter.” (internal footnotes omitted)); Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae at 3, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), (“[R]acial 
discriminations imposed by law, or having the sanction or support of government, 
inevitably tend to undermine the foundations of a society dedicated to freedom, justice, and 
equality.”). 
277 IN CONFERENCE, supra note 248, at 659 (emphasis added). 
278 Roche & Gordon, supra note 128, at 229. 
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the ruling into effect . . . . No one expected any violence nor any real crisis to 
develop. A gradual changeover from the present system to a nonsegregated policy 
was predicted.”279 The newspaper also ran an article summarizing the work of 
psychologist Kenneth Clark, who found desegregation occurring peacefully, even 
in places with “deeply rooted prejudices.”280 Key to success, Clark noted, was the 
perception that the tide of opinion was shifting: “even deeply prejudiced persons 
went along with desegregation when they saw it was accepted by others in the 
community.”281 A Washington Post editorial explained, “The decision will prove, 
we are sure—whatever transient difficulties it may create and whatever irritations 
it may arouse—a profoundly healthy and healing one. It will serve—and 
speedily—to close an ancient wound too long allowed to fester.”282 Now the 
outcome was clear, declared C. Vann Woodward in his lectures at the University 
of Virginia in the fall of 1954. “A unanimous decision, it has all the moral and 
legal authority of the Supreme Court behind it, and it is unthinkable that it can be 
indefinitely evaded.”283 Similarly, Channing H. Tobias, chairman of the NAACP 
board of directors, told a meeting of black leaders soon after Brown that “the entire 
South will meet the test of the Supreme Court decision in the spirit of loyal, law-
abiding citizens.”284  
This optimism, when translated into proposals for implementing school 
desegregation, pointed in two different directions. It encouraged the NAACP legal 
team to push an uncharacteristically aggressive line in its briefs and oral arguments 
on the implementation decree, arguing for “immediate” or “forthwith” 
desegregation. Throughout the school litigation campaign, the NAACP lawyers 
had proven themselves exceptionally adept at taking the temperature of public and 
judicial sentiment, steering their litigation strategy to coincide with this sentiment, 
                                                
279 Benjamin Fine, School Leaders Applaud Decision, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1954, at 
14. 
280 Anti-Bias Trends Listed in Survey, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1954, at 22. 
281 Id. For Clark’s study, see Clark, supra note 231. 
282 Editorial, WASH. POST & TIMES HERALD, in Editorial Excerpts from the Nation’s 
Press on Segregation Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1954, at 19.   
283 WOODWARD, supra note 37, at 149. 
284 Henry Lee Moon, New Emancipation: The Atlanta Conference, NATION, June 5, 
1954, at 484; see also Arkansas Will Conform, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1954, at 18 (quoting 
Gov. Francis Cherry that “Arkansas would not approach the Supreme Court’s ruling with 
the idea of being an ‘outlaw’”); Court Said to End ‘A Sense of Guilt,’ N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 
1954, at 18 (quoting Howard Odum: “[T]he South is likely to surprise itself and the nation 
and do an excellent job of adjustment.”); Lillian Smith, Letter to the Editor, Rules on 
Schools Hailed, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1954, at E10 (noting that Southerners “will accept 
whole heartedly the challenge of making a harmonious, tactful change-over from one kind 
of school to another”); Letter from William T. Coleman to Justice Felix Frankfurter, 
Supreme Court of the United States (May 20, 1954), Felix Frankfurter Papers, Part 3, Reel 
3, Frame 939, Modern Manuscripts Collections, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass. 
(“Now that the Constitutional barrier has been removed, I am quite sure that the 
responsible people on both sides will be able to get together and work out a proper 
implementation of the decision.”). 
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and keeping themselves ready to adjust their tactics to take advantage of new 
openings when opinion developed in favorable directions. As a result, the NAACP 
campaign had two defining characteristics: it tended toward pragmatism and, at 
times, caution; and it was overwhelmingly successful at winning major cases in the 
Supreme Court. Yet the lawyers’ approach to the implementation decision, 
influenced by the heady atmosphere created by their great victory in the 1954 
decision, broke from their traditional caution.285  
In rallying around the principle of forthwith desegregation, the NAACP 
lawyers emphasized in their arguments for Brown II the promising changes that 
were already taking place. Marshall noted that “it matters not whether that firm 
hand is executive, legislative or judicial,” concluding that “the district court, once 
properly instructed by this Court, will be the type of firm hand.”286 “I have no 
doubt whatsoever,” he told the Court, “that the people in South Carolina and North 
Carolina, once the law is made clear, will comply with whatever that court [the 
Fourth Circuit] does.”287 The white primary cases288 had “raised terrific racial 
feeling and it worked out.”289 In the higher education cases,290 state attorneys 
general had predicted catastrophe and “not a single prediction came true.”291 
Within the twelve states that had made efforts to fall in line with the Court’s 
holding in these earlier cases, there was “only one untoward incident.”292 The 
desegregation of interstate transportation facilities resulting from the 1950 
Henderson decision had similarly beneficial results.293 Despite the “dire 
predictions” that the railroad industry would collapse in the South, the ruling 
resulted in “less trouble than we had before.”294 Whenever faced with a major 
social problem, Marshall told the Justices, “the history of our Government shows 
that it is the inherent faith in our democratic process that gets us through, the faith 
that the people in the South are no different from anybody else as to being law-
abiding.”295  
                                                
285 Marshall was initially reluctant to push for the “forthwith” argument, but his 
colleagues eventually convinced him to push the more aggressive line. See KLUGER, supra 
note 16, at 718–23. 
286 ARGUMENT, supra note 191, at 395. 
287 Id. at 396. 
288 Terry v. Adams, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
289 ARGUMENT, supra note 191, at 398; see also Thurgood Marshall, The Rise and 
Collapse of the ‘White Democratic Primary,’ 26 J. NEGRO EDUC. 249, 254 (1957) (arguing 
that the success of the legal attacks on the white primary indicated that southern efforts to 
circumvent Brown were destined to fail). 
290 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 
U.S. 637 (1950). 
291 ARGUMENT, supra note 191, at 398. 
292 Id. 
293 See Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950). 
294 ARGUMENT, supra note 191, at 398. 
295 Id. at 399; see also id. at 436 (“I am particularly shocked at arguments [by 
opposing counsel] of the impotency of our Government to enforce its Constitution.”); Brief 
for Appellants, supra note 276, at 14 n.5 (“In the instant cases, dark and uncertain 
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In their written brief, the NAACP lawyers pressed their case for an aggressive 
legal mandate even more forcefully; and they again drew directly on the legalist 
position.  
 
The underlying assumption—that change in attitude must precede change 
in action—is itself at best a highly questionable one. There is a 
considerable body of evidence to indicate that attitude may itself be 
influenced by situation and that, where the situation demands that an 
individual act as if he were not prejudiced, he will so act, despite the 
continuance, at least temporarily, of the prejudice. We submit that this 
Court can itself contribute to an effective and decisive change in attitude 
by insistence that the present unlawful situation be changed forthwith.296  
 
To support this point, the NAACP cited a list of studies of integration efforts 
in the military, housing, sports, and schools.297  
The NAACP lawyers did not get what they wanted. In its implementation 
ruling, the Supreme Court gave control of desegregation to the lower federal courts 
without strict deadlines.298 The Justices’ refusal to adopt timetables for integration, 
however, was not necessarily because they saw the prospects for a successful 
implementation of the decision in a dramatically different light than the civil rights 
lawyers. Indeed, the Court (with the vocal exception of Justice Black) was largely 
responding to the same optimism that guided the NAACP. Yet the Justices came to 
a quite different conclusion as to what this faith in the command of the law meant 
for framing an implementation policy.  
When considering the implementation decision, a sharp split developed 
between Justice Black and the other justices over the likely impact of the ruling in 
the Deep South. Black continued to say what he had been saying for some time 
now: the South was going to revolt. He warned “[s]ome counties won’t have 
Negroes and whites in the same school this generation. . . . We have no more 
chance to enforce this in the Deep South than to enforce Prohibition in New York 
City . . . . It is futile to think that in these cases we can settle the question of 
segregation in the South.”299 Black proposed that the Court avoid treating the cases 
as class actions on behalf of all black children in segregated schools and limit the 
holding to the named plaintiffs in the case,300 a remarkable concession for a Justice 
who was such a strong proponent within the Court for the ruling in the first place. 
Douglas was the only other justice who thought this approach a good one.301  
________________________ 
prophecies as to anticipated community reactions to school desegregation are speculative at 
best.”). 
296 Brief for Appellants, supra note 276, at 18 (footnotes omitted). 
297 Id. at 18 n.9. 
298 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1955). 
299 IN CONFERENCE, supra note 248, at 665. 
300 Id. at 665–66.  
301 Id. at 667. 
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The other Justices, however, refused to agree with this pessimistic assessment 
of the prospects for desegregation—a point scholars have failed to fully 
appreciate.302 None of the Justices had any illusions about the process being easy, 
but Black had been playing the Cassandra role in all previous civil rights cases, 
and thus far events had largely proven him mistaken. Philip Elman, who was in 
close contact with Frankfurter during this time, noted that Black was “scaring the 
shit out of the justices, especially Frankfurter and Jackson, who didn’t know how 
the Court could enforce a ruling against Plessy.”303 The process of deliberating 
over implementation led many to envision the difficulty of the process of making 
desegregation work. As Frankfurter put it, a “declaration of unconstitutionality is 
not a wand by which these transformations can be accomplished.”304 The Justices 
found themselves face to face with the potential of opposition in the oral 
arguments for the implementation decision during which attorneys for the states 
warned of the challenges desegregation would face.305 “Without a favorable 
community attitude, no satisfactory adjustment is possible,” explained a lawyer for 
Virginia.306 Yet—and here is the key point—most of the Justices remained 
generally hopeful that the momentum for change was already established and that 
the power of the Court’s voice, if its words were carefully chosen, would continue 
to move the issue forward.  
Thus, the same faith in the power of the law that had mobilized racial liberals 
was evident among the Justices as they attempted to imagine the reaction to their 
decision. The Justices (save Black) thought that a well-written decision, one that 
effectively balanced assertion and flexibility, would be critical to the success of 
implementation. Justice Reed, who struggled more than anyone to join the first 
Brown decision, began his comments in the conference of December 1953 by 
noting, “I have a firm belief that there is a considerable group wanting to give this 
decision sympathetic consideration. When some schools are opened, it will have a 
further effect.”307 Although the Justice from Kentucky recognized the potential for 
localized defiance (“our order may result in public schools being abolished”), he 
                                                
302 See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL 
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961, 217, 220–21, 228–31 (1994) (treating the fears 
expressed by Justice Black as representative of the general mood of the Court). 
303 Interview by Richard Kluger with Philip Elman (Aug. 19, 1971), Brown v. Board 
of Education Collection, Series 1, Box 2, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University, New 
Haven, Conn.; see also Elman, supra note 262, at 828. 
304 Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Brethren of the Supreme Court of the 
United States (Jan. 15, 1954), Earl Warren Papers, Container 571, Manuscripts Division, 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.  
305 See, e.g., ARGUMENT, supra note 191, at 433 (Virginia’s Attorney General 
describing “the sudden shock entailed by the uprooting and demolishing of a way of life 
enshrined and institutionalized in the hearts and minds of the overwhelming majority of 
millions of law-abiding citizens, their fierce and deepseated devotion to their customs and 
traditions composing as they do, the warp and woof of their mores of life . . .”). 
306 Id. at 425.  
307 IN CONFERENCE, supra note 248, at 666–67. 
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concluded on an optimistic note: “The border states will be examples.”308 
Frankfurter too insisted on the critical importance of careful leadership by the 
Court: “What we do is largely educational.”309 Dismissing pessimistic findings of 
polls conducted in segregated states, Frankfurter joined Reed in his predicting that 
the entire South would eventually fall into line: “By gradual infiltration of border 
states, the process of desegregation can spread to the Deep South.”310 Justice Clark 
agreed with Frankfurter on the importance of desegregation outside the Deep 
South. “Texas is not going to present many acute problems,” the Texan told his 
fellow Justices.311 “[T]here will not be too much trouble there.”312 There would be 
pockets of resistance and some administrative concerns, but he felt that a gradual 
remedy would be effective.313  
In the face of the massive resistance that soon took shape, the idea that a well-
reasoned, carefully crafted opinion might be effective in significantly mollifying 
opposition to desegregation appears, in a word, quaint. The mobilized opposition, 
when it took shape, would have little concern for the Court’s niceties. Yet the fact 
that this view dominated the Justices’ understanding of what they were 
undertaking was a testament to the exaggerated sense of importance the Justices 
held toward the Court—and, more generally, toward the power of the law. This 
was a lesson that a generation of racial liberals had been insistently trying to 
promulgate to the rest of the nation. In this effort, they had been remarkably 
successful. 
The deep-seated commitment to the guiding force of the law held by 
committed racial liberals is given graphic illustration by Thurgood Marshall’s 
reaction to Brown II. Although he did not get the immediate desegregation with 
strict timetables he had asked for in his arguments, he was still largely satisfied 
with what the Court had produced. This is a striking fact, the only reasonable 
explanation for which is to point to Marshall’s undiminished faith in the power 
inherent in the Court’s command. At a press conference in New York soon after 
the decision came down, the NAACP released a statement that noted: “We see 
nothing in the language of the opinion which sustains the view of some Southern 
states that delay in compliance may be of indefinite length.”314 In a private 
conversation a few days later, Marshall declared: “The more I think about it, I 
think it’s a damned good decision! . . . [T]he laws have got to yield! They’ve got to 
yield to the Constitution.”315 “You can say all you want,” he concluded, “but those 
                                                
308 Id. at 666.  
309 Id. at 667. 
310 Id. 
311 Id. at 668. 
312 Id. 
313 Id. 
314 Id.  
315 KLUGER, supra note 16, at 746–47 (quoting transcribed conversation with Carl 
Murphy). 
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white crackers are going to get tired of having Negro lawyers beating ‘em every 
day in court. They’re going to get tired of it.”316 
The commitment of the NAACP leadership to this hopeful vision of racial 
change was more than just Thurgood Marshall and his colleagues advocating for 
their clients. Civil rights leaders of the day not only used racial liberal assumptions 
as a tool for forwarding their agenda, they also were committed to—perhaps, in 
ways, even seduced by—racial liberal ideology, especially the faith in the power of 
legal reform. The entire school desegregation litigation campaign was premised on 
a deep commitment to the power of the courts and, more generally, the laws to 
shape human behavior. Years later Marshall would recall, “I had thought, we’d all 
thought, that once we got the Brown case, the thing was going to be over.”317 
Marshall’s colleague Robert Carter would later regret the narrow focus of the 
NAACP on attacking de jure segregation rather than focusing on the more basic 
concerns of educational opportunity.318 “In a sense, these men were profoundly 
naïve,” noted a scholar who worked with the NAACP lawyers.319 “They really felt 
that once the legal barriers fell, the whole black-white situation would change.”320 
Marshall, in particular, “truly believed in the United States and the Constitution, 
but that the whole system was tragically flawed by the segregation laws. Wipe 
away those laws and the whole picture would change.”321 
Marshall was not alone among the pioneering generation of civil rights 
lawyers in his optimistic assessment of the prospects for implementation. As late 
as 1957, Judge William H. Hastie, who had helped in the early stages of the 
NAACP’s litigation campaign before becoming the first African American 
                                                
316 Id. at 747; see also JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A 
CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 78 (2001) (quoting Marshall, in 
1956, saying, “We’ve got the other side licked. It’s just a matter of time”); Robert Carter & 
Thurgood Marshall, The Meaning and Significance of the Supreme Court Decree, 24 J. 
NEGRO EDUC. 397, 397 (1955) (“[T]he formula devised is about as effective as one could 
have expected. The net result should be to unite the country behind a nationwide 
desegregation program, and if this takes place, the Court must be credited with having 
performed its job brilliantly.”).  
Later in life Marshall would say that he was “shattered” by the 1955 decision. “They 
gave us nothing and then told us to work for it. I thought I was the dumbest Negro in the 
United States,” he recalled. Cass Sunstein, Did Brown Matter?, NEW YORKER, May 3, 
2004, at 103. Yet contemporary evidence indicates that Marshall, while surely disappointed 
by not convincing the Court to follow the NAACP recommendation for immediate 
desegregation, was generally satisfied with the implementation decree. 
317 THURGOOD MARSHALL: HIS SPEECHES, WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS, AND 
REMINISCENCES 463 (Mark V. Tushnet ed., 2001). 
318 See KLUGER, supra note 16, at 534 (quoting Robert Carter, “we really had the 
feeling that segregation itself was the evil—and not a symptom of the deeper evil of 
racism”); Robert L. Carter, A Reassessment of Brown v. Board, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 21, 21–28 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980). 
319 KLUGER, supra note 16, at 639 (quoting Alfred Kelley). 
320 Id. 
321 Id. 
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appointed to a federal court of appeals, believed that the battles of civil rights 
litigation were all but over. “Son,” he told a young black lawyer interested in 
following in his footsteps, “I am afraid that you were born fifteen years too late to 
have a career in civil rights.”322 In the immediate aftermath of the Brown decisions, 
Marshall’s optimism was more the rule than the exception among the decision’s 
supporters. 
 
V.  FAITH TESTED: THE ORDEAL OF IMPLEMENTATION AND MASSIVE RESISTANCE 
 
The triumph of Brown was ironically also a new challenge to the premise that 
the law could lead the battle against racial prejudice. Court-mandated school 
desegregation soon inspired organized resistance—widespread rejection of federal 
law—that refuted the ideological heart of racial liberalism. Those who had been 
arguing for the past decade that the nation was ready for change and that the 
strength of the law would effectively bring outliers in line with national opinion 
were not prepared for massive resistance. Thus Brown was at once a triumphant 
achievement of the campaign to reenvision the capacity of the law, even as it 
became a new point of departure for a powerful reconsideration of the legalist 
position. Brown became a contested symbol, claimed by both legalists and skeptics 
in their debate over the relationship between law and social reform. 
 
A.  Massive Resistance 
 
While the initial Brown decision was accompanied by considerable optimism, 
much of this hopefulness dissolved in the years following Brown II. In the face of 
massive resistance, “[t]he judicial process had reached the limit of its capacity.”323 
While segregationists countered Brown with attempts at legal refutation, by 
challenging the Court’s reliance on psychology324 or even going so far as to defend 
a state’s right to “interposition,”325 massive resistance, at its most effective, was a 
mobilized political and social movement. As explained by one of the attorneys 
who argued on behalf of South Carolina before the Court in Brown:  
 
Our only hope, at present, lies not in carrying on the battle in the courts 
by the presentation of legal defense, but in taking the battle to the people 
and using the same psychological and sociological warfare that has been 
                                                
322 The young lawyer was Derrick Bell, and the episode with Hastie is recorded in 
DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE 
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 3 (2004). 
323 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 256 (1962). 
324 See, e.g., NEWBY, supra note 276, at 33, 63–65. 
325 See, e.g., NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND 
POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950’S 126–49 (1969). 
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so successfully carried on against us, i.e., the principles of mass 
psychology expressed through organized public opinion.326  
 
In essence, the white South hoped to bypass unsupportive legal institutions and 
launch a Myrdalian “educational offensive,” only this time with the goal of 
bolstering the failing Jim Crow system. 
The opening salvo of massive resistance came in the form of a congressional 
statement, the so-called “Southern Manifesto” of March 12, 1956, which 
denounced the Brown decisions as a “clear abuse of judicial power” that trampled 
on “the reserved rights of the states and the people.”327 The separate-but-equal 
principle “restated time and again, became a part of the life of the people of many 
of the States and confirmed their habits, customs, traditions, and way of life.”328 
The Manifesto helped transform scattered discontent and prevalent uncertainty into 
a united, even “respectable,” movement, as southern politicians rallied behind their 
shared opposition to “forced” integration of schools.329 And in doing so, they also 
rallied behind an effort to elevate their commitment to “folkways” against the 
“stateways” embodied in the Brown decision. Again, quoting Bickel:  
 
The Supreme Court’s law, the southern leaders realized, could not 
in our system prevail—not merely in the very long run, but within the 
decade—if it ran counter to deeply felt popular needs or convictions, or 
even if it was opposed by a determined and substantial minority and 
received with indifference by the rest of the country.330  
 
Of course, many had always resisted the arguments of the racial liberals that 
the law of the land would be enough to break apart Jim Crow: some because they 
supported segregation as a policy and a practice, some because they retained a 
Sumnerian skepticism toward the capacity of the law, some because of a mixture 
of the two. But with the white South organized around a commitment to preserving 
segregation, critics of racial liberalism’s vision of the capacity of the law, who had 
been in retreat, throwing out last-ditch arguments of a position whose time had 
passed, now gained a new level of credence and legitimacy. Before massive 
resistance, these skeptics might have been dismissed as nothing more than 
defenders of the dying cause of Jim Crow. Now some of their claims seemed to 
have a ring of truth to them. They seemed to capture, better than the claims of 
legalists, what was happening in the nation, as an entire region of the country had 
committed itself to refuting the clear mandate of the Supreme Court—and doing so 
in the name of local customs and mores. 
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The most prominent representative of this skeptical position was President 
Eisenhower. Eisenhower rejected the racial liberal claims for the capacity of law to 
undermine negative racial attitudes. In the aftermath of Brown, he repeatedly 
dismissed the idea that law could affect prejudice. “[I]t is difficult through law and 
through force to change a man’s heart,” he explained at a 1956 news conference.331  
 
[W]e must all . . . help to bring about a change in spirit so that extremists 
on both sides do not defeat what we know is a reasonable, logical 
conclusion to this whole affair, which is recognition of equality of men. . 
. . This is a question of leadership and training and teaching people, and 
it takes some time, unfortunately.332  
 
Eisenhower used this skepticism to justify his tepid public support for federal 
involvement in desegregating schools.333 Eisenhower only roused himself to act on 
behalf of Brown in the face of a flagrant challenge to federal authority in the Little 
Rock Crisis of 1957.334  
Eisenhower’s skeptical assessment of the potential of civil rights reform 
seemed to many a fair explanation for the limited efficacy of Brown and the 
emergence of organized white southern resistance, with its threatening calls for 
interposition and nullification. Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic presidential 
candidate in 1952 and 1956, who prior to Brown had expressed moderate support 
for federal civil rights measures,335 now mirrored Eisenhower’s views on the 
relationship between race relations and law. “On civil rights,” historian Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr., recorded in his diary following a conversation with Stevenson in 
1956,  
 
he kept saying that the basic fact was the difficulty of the adjustment; 
that it was raising false hopes to suggest that people’s minds and hearts 
could be changed by coercion; that the Negro leaders were defeating 
their own purposes when they put on pressure; that the only Negro hope 
was to reduce tension and let the moderate-minded southerners assume 
                                                
331 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The President’s News Conference of September 5, 1956, 
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local leadership and work out the problems of adjustment in a gradualist 
way.336  
 
Leadership on the civil rights issue, Stevenson believed, required the President to 
play the role of a “conciliator,” not the imposition of new legal requirements; he 
even suggested the idea of calling for “a year moratorium on all further agitation, 
legal action, etc. in the civil rights field.”337 
Segregationists predictably trotted out the failures of Reconstruction and 
Prohibition to demonstrate the futility of legal reforms that ran against entrenched 
beliefs and practices. The Attorney General of Virginia, in response to what he 
called Thurgood Marshall’s “siren song entitled ‘the People of the South are Law-
abiding People,’” told the Court in the oral arguments in Brown II:  
 
Yes, we are an orderly law-abiding people. We lead in giving law and 
order to the nation. We washed the Eighteenth Amendment out of the 
Constitution and flooded the Volstead Act to oblivion on the stream of 
our honest spirits because it affected the way of life of the American 
people.338  
 
(To this, Marshall responded that he was “shocked that anybody classes that right 
to take a drink of whiskey involved in prohibition with the right of a Negro child to 
participate in education.”339) Organized resistance to desegregation expanded 
efforts to resurrect the ghosts of Reconstruction and Prohibition. Whites in the 
South must “shape their destiny and control their way of life, just as they did in the 
far more dangerous period of Reconstruction,” instructed a segregationist editor.340 
In the wake of the Little Rock crisis, a law professor at Southern Methodist 
University in Texas who supported integration warned that pressing desegregation 
too quickly would only lead to more opposition. It was “extremely hard [to change 
popular attitudes] overnight by a court decree . . . . The people of the North didn’t 
change their habits in regard to drinking promptly because of the 18th 
Amendment.”341 One fervent defender of states’ rights and segregation wrote an 
open letter to Eisenhower in 1959 condemning his role in the Little Rock 
showdown. “To force [desegregation] upon the Southern white will, I think, meet 
with as much opposition as the prohibition amendment encountered in the wet 
states.”342 Similarly, in making his case against pending civil rights legislation in 
1960, Senator William Fulbright referenced the failure of Prohibition, concluding, 
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“legislation to regulate men’s mores is doomed to failure.”343 Ominous references 
to Reconstruction and Prohibition remained a touchstone for critics of federal civil 
rights law into the 1960s. 
 
B.  The Capacity of the Law Reconsidered 
 
With the strengthening of massive resistance emboldening civil rights 
opponents in their dismissal of civil rights law as ineffective or even 
counterproductive, racial liberals found their commitment to their optimistic claims 
of the pre-Brown period sorely tested. For some supporters of the civil rights 
project of the 1950s and 1960s, the experience of implementing school 
desegregation, with dramatic victories, frequent disappointments, and practically 
no integration in the Deep South for at least a decade following Brown, led to a 
more chastened vision of the capacity of the law.  
In the aftermath of Brown, more measured assumptions about the role of law 
in shaping social behavior gained prominence among legal scholars, historians, and 
social psychologists. Within legal academia, perhaps no scholar more thoroughly 
and thoughtfully probed the limitations of the law in the decades following Brown 
than Alexander Bickel. Bickel’s major contribution was to inject a recognition of 
expediency and efficacy of legal change into the judicial formulation of legal 
principles.344 The legitimacy of a Supreme Court decision, he argued, derived from 
social acceptance of the principle underlying that decision.345 Bickel envisioned a 
dialogic relationship—“a continuing colloquy”—between the Court, which 
translates fundamental principles into legal commands, and society (represented 
most prominently by the elected branches of government).346 This sensitivity to the 
need for principled pragmatism in the reformation of the law347 only increased in 
subsequent years, as Bickel came to increasingly emphasize tradition and custom 
as the basis for legal development.348  
C. Vann Woodward’s thesis from The Strange Career of Jim Crow—that the 
appearance of Jim Crow laws marked a fundamentally new and more repressive 
stage in southern race relations—came under fire as scholars unearthed prejudicial 
attitudes and discriminatory practices that thrived without the imprimatur of Jim 
Crow laws.349 Woodward would spend much of his career qualifying some of the 
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more sweeping statements about the role of the law in Strange Career and refuting 
its simplistic cooptation.350 As massive resistance took form, he would reconsider 
his assertion that the South would follow the Court’s lead.351 The post-Brown 
period also saw social psychologists questioning the overly optimistic conclusions 
toward the possibility of intergroup contact that had been promoted following 
WWII.352 
One group particularly shaped by the failed promises of Brown were young 
African Americans in the South. They had been told that the Supreme Court had 
ended segregation in schools, yet most continued to attend, year after year, the 
same separate schools. When they saw the drama of the Little Rock “nine,” the 
black students who integrated Central High School under the protection of federal 
troops, they saw not the power of the law so much as heroic public defiance in the 
face of injustice. Then, in 1960, this generation of African American students 
decided to pursue a new approach to achieving racial change, an approach that 
would not rely on laws and legal institutions. The student sit-in movement of 1960 
was in large part a reaction to the failures of school desegregation and the limited 
achievements of civil rights reform. As much as possible, student demonstrators 
pushed the law to the side, recognized (without necessarily accepting) the 
disjuncture between morality and legality, and worked to change minds more than 
laws. Rather than focusing on legal reform, they spoke more of ridding society of 
offensive practices that were designed to subjugate and humiliate African 
Americans. And the best way to attack these practices was to appeal to the 
conscience of whites—not to “force” them to change through legal compulsion, 
but to convince them to see the injustice of their way of life.353 
Martin Luther King, Jr. immediately grasped the significance of the sit-ins as 
an alternative to an NAACP-led project of school desegregation litigation that, by 
this point, had stalled in the face of legal delays interspersed with occasional token 
efforts at integration. To King, the students were “seeking to dignify the law and to 
________________________ 
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affirm the real and positive meaning of the law of the land.”354 In rejecting the 
idealistic vision of the law that pervaded the NAACP’s work leading up to 
Brown,355 he adopted instead an explanation for the relationship between law and 
prejudicial attitudes that balanced an appreciation of the value of legal change with 
a call to go beyond just changing laws. “The law tends to declare rights—it does 
not deliver them. A catalyst is needed to breathe life experience into a judicial 
decision by the persistent exercise of the rights until they become usual and 
ordinary in human conduct.”356 King’s vision of social justice demanded not only 
legal reform, through recognized institutional channels such as litigation and 
lobbying, but also social action, through nonviolent protest. The invaluable 
contribution of King to the struggle for racial equality stemmed from his 
skepticism toward the efficacy of legal change when it was unaccompanied by 
organized social action. His vision resonated in the post-Brown years, when the 
limited accomplishments of school desegregation litigation challenged the central 
claim of racial liberalism. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
The political world of make-believe mingles with the real world in 
strange ways, for the make-believe world may often mold the real one . . . 
. Because fictions are necessary, because we cannot live without them, 
we often take pains to prevent their collapse by moving the facts to fit the 
fiction, by making our world conform more closely to what we want it to 
be. We sometimes call it, quite appropriately, reform or reformation, 
when the fiction takes command and reshapes reality.357 
 
The debate over the capacity of the law invariably comes down, at one point 
or another, to a leap of faith—it involves, in historian Edmund Morgan’s words, a 
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turn to “fiction.”358 The question is simply too indeterminate, with too many 
moving parts, too many angles of approach. In a complex society with multiple 
levels of governance and a diverse populace, one can always find examples of law 
reshaping beliefs and practices, just as one can always find support for the failure 
of law to do the same. When evaluating the efficacy of the law during the height of 
Jim Crow, for example, one’s conclusions will be sharply different depending on 
whether one focuses on Jim Crow legislation in the states (as Woodward did), or 
whether one focuses on the failure of the Fourteenth Amendment and federal civil 
rights legislation to protect the most basic rights of African Americans—or even 
the egregious failure of Plessy to ensure real equality of segregated facilities. 
Whether one finds “law” in the Jim Crow era (or any era) effective or not largely 
depends on one’s starting assumptions about which laws are most relevant. 
Furthermore, modern-day defenders of the capacity of the law have rightly 
emphasized the subtle ways in which the law can operate to influence social 
interactions or shape consciousness. Even if a legal mandate from the Supreme 
Court may have limited direct influence, new legal norms seep into society, 
making some options seem more legitimate or feasible, while discouraging 
others—and thus affecting (if not necessarily dictating) social practices, customs, 
and attitudes.359 Yet even this cultural analysis of the efficacy of law points in 
different directions: social historians have demonstrated that oppressed groups 
have countless ways to exercise resistance and autonomy, even within oppressive 
legal systems.360 
In light of these complications, any sweeping generalization of what the law 
and the courts can do necessarily slips into a discussion of what the law and the 
courts should do. In this case, the descriptive is inherently, insistently normative. 
Exaggerated conclusions about the incapacity of the law have always been used to 
bolster underlying skepticism toward whether the law should be employed for a 
particular end. In the era of Jim Crow, a commitment to white supremacy was 
often rationalized through skepticism toward the power of law to challenge social 
inequality. And the converse has also held: exaggerated estimates for the capacity 
of the law reinforced the positions of those who are already committed to pressing 
legal reform through the courts. 
The inescapable complexity of the question of what law can accomplish, and 
the inevitable normativity of the debate over law’s capacity, were exemplified in 
the racial liberalism of the 1940s and 1950s. The legalist position was a powerful 
weapon of reform. It was a necessary corrective to the self-serving, status-quo 
enforcing skepticism toward the law embodied in the Plessy Court’s dismissal of 
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laws as powerless to affect “racial instincts.”361 This was a useful, perhaps even 
necessary, fiction—a fiction that contained the possibility of creating an 
atmosphere in which facts might eventually conform to aspiration, when “the 
fiction takes command and reshapes reality.”362 The postwar campaign to promote 
the efficacy of civil rights reform helped to open opportunities in the cause of 
racial equality that would have been inconceivable to earlier generations. Without 
the deeply held optimism toward the capacity of law to release American society 
from the fetters of Jim Crow practices and racist beliefs, it is hard to imagine that 
the liberal establishment would have accepted civil rights reform, including legally 
mandated desegregation, as a necessary part of the public policy landscape of the 
day. And without this baseline of support, the Supreme Court would never have 
taken their monumental step in Brown.363 
Yet, like Myrdal’s claim for the pervasiveness of racial egalitarianism, the 
claims of racial liberalism outran reality, contributing to an overly sanguine idea 
on the part of activists and judges of what court decisions and other legal changes 
could actually accomplish. So while recognizing the unquestionable achievements 
of racial legalism, one must also acknowledge that this newfound appreciation for 
law’s capacity in the field of race relations had its costs. By promoting 
antidiscrimination law as the key to unlocking generations of entrenched social 
inequality, legalists shifted attention from other paths toward the goal of racial 
justice. The intensive focus on using laws to undermine prejudicial attitudes 
deemphasized the structural elements of racial inequality. The inflated optimism 
toward the potential of turning the law against discriminatory behavior pulled 
energy and resources from efforts to promote equality through economic reform; 
advocates of this path often argued for an alliance between the civil rights 
movement and the labor movement. The belief that racial justice would come 
through structural and economic transformation more than antidiscrimination law 
dominated the progressive agenda in the 1930s and early 1940s.364 The subsequent 
rise of racial legalism contributed to the marginalization of these arguments. 
Finally, another cost of racial legalism was its downgrading of the importance of 
on-the-ground struggle, protest, and resistance as a necessary element in creating 
the conditions necessary for social change. 
Eventually, the claims of racial liberals helped set in motion events that would 
fulfill, to a considerable extent, their promises to reshape social norms. In the 
process of creating a new ideology of civil rights, racial legalism dramatically 
raised expectations for change, and when the majesty of the law failed to deliver 
on these promises, disappointment and frustration inspired other avenues of 
reform. Thus, the challenge to racial liberal expectations in the wake of Brown was 
a critical factor in launching the next stage of the civil rights movement, when the 
frontlines of the battle moved from the courtroom to the streets. Postwar racial 
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liberals were essential, if largely unwitting, forefathers of direct-action protests of 
the 1960s, a movement far more skeptical toward the capacity of the law than the 
liberal reformers of the previous generation. These protests were driven by the goal 
not only of making the law more just—for as the failed promise of Brown had 
made clear, this was just an initial step—but of ensuring that legal principles 
would be translated into a more just society. 
